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ELITE MYTHMAKING ON THE RUN: THE CASE OF WORLD WAR TWO 
NARRATIVE IN MODERN UKRAINE 
Andrii Nekoliak 
  
ABSTRACT 
          The thesis inquires into governmental memory politics in Ukraine in the aftermath 
of Euromaidan protests focusing on the representation of the Second World War. At the 
theoretical level, the thesis has scrutinized concepts pertaining to studies in memory 
politics: political memory, memory agents, elite-mythmaking, and narratives. It also 
conceptualized the European discourses on the Second World War in order to evaluate 
newly forged Ukrainian narrative on WW2 in their light. At the analysis level, the thesis 
both scrutinized official legislative and administrative measures pertaining to WW2 
remembrance as well as applied narrative analysis to the case of newly introduced narrative 
about the Ukrainians in WW2 by developing a set of narrative analysis categories. As the 
thesis argues, elite-mythmaking selectively ‘Europeanizes’ Ukrainian representation of 
WW2 while the narrative follows the essential characteristics of the Eastern Central 
European (ECE) historical narrative about the Second World War. 
 
 
4 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
     Introduction…………..……………………………………………………………………...6 
1. Introducing the framework: political memory and elite mythmaking……………….......8 
1.1. Political memory……….………………………………………………………………..8 
1.2. Memory agents………….……………………………………………………………...11 
1.3. Elite Mythmaking……….……………………………………………………………...15 
1.4. Narratives………………..……………………………………………………………...20 
2. European discourses on WW2 and trajectories of memory politics in modern 
Ukraine…………………………………..………………………………………………24 
2.1.European discourses on WW2…………….…………………………………………….24 
2.2. Trajectories of memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine……….……………………….29 
2.3. Elite mythmaking in post-Euromaidan Ukraine………….…………………………….34 
3. Narrative analysis and sample texts analysed…………….…………………………......41 
3.1. Narrative analysis as a research agenda………………….……………………………..41 
3.2. Eastern Central European (ECE) historical narrative template….….…………………..42 
3.3. Analysis categories: Antagonist and Protagonist…………………..……………...........44 
3.4. Analysis categories: Key events……………………………………..………………….44 
3.5. Analysis categories: Character of the narrative………………………..………………..45 
3.6. Analysis categories: Plot…………………………………………..……………………46 
4. Narrative analysis………………………………………………………..………………48 
4.1. Antagonist and Protagonist………………………………………………..…………….48 
4.1.1. The President……..………………………………………………………………50 
     4.1.2. The Parliament………………………………………………………..……………….52 
           4.1.3. The UINR……………………………………………………………..……………….53 
     4.2. Key events: Ukrainian nationalist underground, the Holocaust and Volyn massacres of 
1943…………………………………………………………………………………………57 
     4.2.1. The Ukrainian nationalists…………………………………………………………….57 
     4.2.2. The Holocaust…………………………………………………………………………61 
     4.2.3. The Volyn massacres of 1943…………………………………………………………63 
     4.3. Narrative’s character…………………………………………………………………….64 
     4.4. Narrative’s plot………………………………………………………………………….65 
     4.5. Discussion……………………………………………………………………………….67 
 
 
5 
 
     Conclusions…………………………..………………………………………….…………..71 
     Bibliography……….…………………..……………………………………….……………73 
     Documents and analysed texts……………………………………………………………….79 
     Video-materials……………………………...…………………………………………...….92 
 
Appendices:  
Annex 1: Table 2. Antagonist and Protagonist according to UINR  
Annex 2: Table 3. The Holocaust and “The War and the Myth” (Viatrovych et al., 2016) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Introduction       
          Remembrance of World War Two and issues pertaining to the representation of 
wartime past constitute a salient facet of political dynamics in the Eastern Europe. In fact, 
the narration of the past and interpretations of wartime events are often in a spotlight of 
political developments domestically and fierce ‘memory wars’ internationally (Blacker et 
al., 2013). The representation of the past is a hostage to memory politics and is constitutive 
to how modern societies not only frame the past per se, but also how they build up identities 
of the communities in the present.  
          Political developments in post-2014 Ukraine have placed a new importance on 
official governmental memory politics around remembrance of the Second World War 
(WW2). The representation of the past fell under unprecedented legislative and 
administrative scrutiny of political elites (memory agents) on how to commemorate and 
narrate the past. The aim of this thesis is to investigate this recent memory politics 
insurgency by outlining its main legislative, administrative, commemorative facets on the 
one hand and inquiring into what political elites communicate about WW2 in the content 
of this narrative on the other. The puzzle to investigate is whether the memory politics 
regarding WW2 in modern Ukraine may be called ‘European’ according to both what this 
politics installs in official public remembrance and what political elites communicate about 
the war themselves.  
         On the conceptual level, the thesis seeks to illustrate the conceptual argument that 
political elites engage in elite-mythmaking and narrative construction to install preferable 
representation of the past on the case of WW2 remembrance in modern Ukraine. Also, it 
conceptualizes the European discourses on WW2 in order to evaluate the newly forged 
Ukrainian narrative in their light thereafter. Thus, building on existing memory politics 
and narrative construction scholarship, the thesis scrutinizes both the memory agents’ 
mythmaking measures (political memory construction) and what these agents 
communicate about the Ukrainians in WW2 (narrative construction). 
         Against the backdrop of stated by the memory agents ‘Europeaness’ of new WW2 
representation, this thesis investigates political memory construction and newly proposed 
narrative about the Ukrainians in WW2. Specifically, it tries to find out whether elite-
mythmaking ‘Europeanizes’ Ukraine’s representation of the past and whether the narrative 
can be called ‘European’ or ‘Europeanized’ historical narrative on WW2. Additionally, in 
terms of practical relevance, the thesis’s aspiration is to contemplate about compatibility 
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of elite-mythmaking with Ukraine’s goal towards a pluralistic society stated by the 
champions of Euromaidan protests. 
          On the empirical level, the thesis engages in narrative analysis of the texts 
disseminated by the memory agents according to a set of developed analytical categories: 
antagonist and protagonist; key events; narrative’s character and narrative’s plot. The 
thesis uses the premises of structural and thematic narrative analysis in order to focus on 
both content and story-telling characteristics of the narrative and get comprehensive 
understanding of the relationships between its parts (antagonist v protagonist, key events 
and their place in the narrative, the abstract ‘plot’ relating the other parts). Further, the 
President, the Parliament and the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance are the 
main governmental ‘stakeholders’ over the representation and narration of WW2 in 
Ukraine. Thus, the narrative data analyzed includes presidential speeches, the 
remembrance institute’s books and video-materials as well as verbatim reports of the 
parliamentary sessions amounting to 39 texts and 19 video-clips. The collected texts were 
published or presented in 2014-2017 and intended to reflect post-Euromaidan memory 
politics. One limitation should be stressed. The analysis did not include texts pertaining to 
May 8 and 9 commemorations in 2017 due to time limits to complete the thesis on time. 
          The thesis has four chapters. The first chapter scrutinizes four main concepts: 
political memory, memory agents, elite-mythmaking and narratives. The second chapter 
conceptualizes the European discourses on WW2 as well as discusses trajectories of 
memory politics in Ukraine and the saliency of post-2014 memory politics in comparison 
to the two post-Soviet decades (1990s-2000s) based on scholarly literature over the issues. 
It also contains the core thesis pertaining to elite-mythmaking in modern Ukraine. The 
third chapter elaborates on narrative analysis as a research agenda, outlines analysis 
categories and speaks about narrative data analyzed in the thesis in more detail. Finally, 
the fourth chapter proceeds with the analysis of the narrative, discusses the findings and 
wraps up the elite-mythmaking argument. 
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1. Introducing the framework: Political memory and elite mythmaking 
  
          Emerging after the break-up of the Soviet Union successors states have found 
themselves in circumstances of post-imperial nation-building (Pääbo, 2011, p. 10-11). In 
the field of collective memory construction, new political realities allowed the Soviet 
successor states to narrate their own past in ways considerably different from previously 
official history (Blacker et al., 2013, p. 3-5). Collective memory and narration of the past 
are no longer subjects of state-driven suppression and omissions (ibid.). In fact, as Kuzio 
argues, the mentioned states are ‘re-claiming the past from the framework imposed by the 
former imperial core and thereby creating, or reviving, a national historiography that helps 
to consolidate the new national state.’ (Kuzio, 2002, p. 241) 
          The following chapter explores the main concepts for the Master’s thesis. It utilizes 
scholarships on political memory, memory agents, elite mythmaking and narratives. The 
goal behind such theorizing is to show that political elites mediate, exploit and 
institutionalize preferable representation of the past through particular historical narratives.  
 
1.1. Political memory 
          The notion of collective memory was originally coined by Maurice Halbwachs in 
1925 (Olick, 1992, p. 334). Halbwachs was the first to think of memory and remembrance 
as a social phenomena possible under social context of a group or, in Halbwachs’s words, 
‘social frameworks’ (see Olick, 1992, p. 334-336). His theorizing lays in the foundations 
of nearly every modern account on social memory. For instance, Crenzel and Allier-
Montano state their preference to Halbwachs’s approach by arguing that ‘individuals 
remember in their capacity as members of spatially defined and temporally situated groups 
that give meaning to individual experiences through specific frameworks’ (Crenzel and 
Allier-Montano, 2015, p. 2). Similarly, Misztal speaks about the individual act of 
remembering as socially and culturally conditioned. Remembering is ‘being constructed 
from cultural forms and constrained by our social context’ (Misztal, 2003, p. 11). 
Therefore, collective memory as such is ‘the integration of various different personal pasts 
into a single common past that all members of community come to remember collectively’ 
(ibid., p. 11). Memory is shared with other members of a group (intersubjective) through 
various cultural practices and communicated in various cultural forms (institutions and 
artifacts) (ibid., p. 12-13).  
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          Aleida Assmann has advanced the conceptualization of collective memory further 
differentiating between its sub-types and introducing the notion of political memory. 
          The concept of political memory refers to ‘collective units’ such as nations and states 
in their effort to validate political actions or influence identity formation (A. Assmann, 
2004, p. 25). A. Assmann differentiates collective memory on sub-types and positions 
political memory between social memory, which unites members of one generation, and 
cultural memory as an inactive (‘archival’) phenomenon (ibid., p. 25, 31-32).  
          On the one hand, political memory is distinct from social memory because it is 
intergenerational – political memory is transmitted between generations while social 
memory is not (ibid., p. 25). Moreover, political memory is inherently a ‘top-down’ 
phenomenon meaning that certain agents establish and uphold it in contrast to ‘bottom-up’ 
social memory (ibid.). On the other hand, political memory has an audience. Political 
memory expresses itself through a narrative, which constructs a coherent and emotionally 
compelling story of glorification or victimization, and is embedded in ‘material and visual’ 
as well as ‘performative’ (commemorative) representations (ibid., p. 26). These 
representations include symbols and texts, images and places, rites, commemoration 
ceremonies and monuments (ibid., p. 26; A. Assmann, 2008b, p. 55-56). At the same time, 
cultural memory refers not only to signs and artifacts, which are publicly circulated with 
attached meanings to them, but also to the ones that are not communicated or attended. In 
other words, political memory is always an ‘active’ one, whereas cultural memory exists 
in an inactive, or ‘archival’, form as well (A. Assmann, 2004, p. 31). 
          A. Assmann speaks elsewhere about active and inactive cultural memory by 
introducing the concept of canon and archive (2008a, p. 97-98). The former pertains to 
publicly communicated memory within a society, while the latter indicates a ‘passively 
stored’ memory of the past (ibid., 98). These categories encompass dynamics of 
remembering and forgetting inherent for cultural memory as a whole.   
          As a continuation of A. Assmann’s reasoning, Pääbo emphasizes the involvement 
of political power in his conceptualization. He defines cultural memory as a ‘top-down 
political memory related to power and constructed mainly by leaders of groups’ (Pääbo, 
2011, p. 12). In other words, conceptual boundaries of cultural memory coincide with those 
of political as far as power relations penetrate what and how social groups remember. This 
indicates construction and installation of political memory from above. 
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          Similarly, Jan Assmann also links political memory to power. In his view, political 
memory derives from ‘political organization that institutes it’ (J. Assmann, 2010, p. 122). 
The link of political memory to particular polity broadly speaking distinguishes it from 
other types of cultural memory. Although J. Assmann does not aim to define political 
organization in the text he gives examples of Nazi Germany and the French Republic as 
correspondent political organizations of particular political memories (ibid.). 
          Relation of political memory to power ultimately means that the former can change. 
Political memory is malleable to re-framing and depends on the broader context of political 
developments. In particular, political regime change contributes to how the past is 
communicated and framed.  
          Allier-Montano and Crenzel (eds., 2015) explore the relationship between regime 
change and social memory in a comprehensive case study on political violence 
remembrance in Latin America. According to the authors, renegotiating the meaning of 
the past events of violence has occurred as result of political transition in the region (2015, 
p. 10-11). This process manifests itself not only in creation of new narratives of ‘public 
truth’ about the experiences of mass political repression, exclusion and violence, but also 
in creation of new memory sites, circulation of documents and testimonies of the victims 
(ibid., p. 11). Those, to use A. Assmann’s vocabulary, material and performative signs and 
artifacts install new elements into political memories of post-dictatorial Latin American 
societies.  
          Furthermore, Assmann and Shortt (eds., 2012) argue about the dynamic and 
changing nature of memory as well. Representation of the past is mediated under a 
particular ‘cultural frame and political constellation’ (Assmann and Shortt, 2012, p. 3). In 
this relation, political regime change alters existing political constellations and establishes 
a competing set of value orientations in politics and society; regime change informs re-
framing of political memory in public space by renaming streets and installing new 
commemorative events for instance (ibid., p. 7). 
          Drawing from outlined scholarly literature, it is possible to conclude that political 
memory refers to the collectively remembered past by large social groups that involve 
political organization or a political regime’s agency in its construction and communication. 
Political memory is publicly communicated through various material (texts, symbols, 
memorial sites) and commemorative representations. Those cultural forms usually embody 
a narrative of the national past, which has specific nation-glorifying or nation-victimizing 
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character. Finally, political developments, and political regime change in particular, inform 
reconstruction of political memory. 
 
1.2. Memory agents 
          It is possible to distinguish several attempts to conceptualize actors of ‘memory 
work’ (memory agents) in scholarly literature. These attempts stem from different sub-
fields of social and political sciences. 
          Cultural trauma theory advanced by Alexander (2004) outlines the process of 
cultural trauma formation involving important social actors as its agents. In cultural trauma 
construction, social groups or collectivities are seen as makers of solidarity pertaining to 
previously experienced suffering by members of collectivity (Alexander, 2004, p. 1). 
Traumatized groups seek representation by referring to harmful social processes or events 
that had affected their members (ibid., p. 11). Alexander uses the notion of ‘carrier groups’ 
to describe collectivities in their efforts to gain  symbolic representation and recognition. 
In other words, carrier groups are the agents of cultural trauma construction from behalf 
of collectivities: 
               “Carrier groups may be elites, but they may also be denigrated and marginalized classes. 
They may be prestigious religious leaders or groups whom the majority has designated as spiritual 
pariahs. A carrier group can be generational, representing the perspectives and interests of a 
younger generation against the older one.” (ibid., p. 11) 
          Alexander takes a broad approach to defining memory agents of cultural trauma 
construction. The definition proposes an open-ended list of entities that can be carrier 
groups depending on particular societal context and usually including various religious, 
national, institutional actors. Nevertheless, the most important characteristics of carrier 
groups are that they articulate cultural trauma, have a place in the social structure of 
society, and possess resources to pursue acknowledgment (ibid.). 
          The other attempt to conceptualize memory agents comes from ‘memory games’ 
scholarship. The scholarship seeks to conceptualize ‘political uses of memory’ by various 
societal and political actors. In the most succinct manner, the ‘memory games’ argument 
holds that memory agents engage different ‘historicising strategies’ in order to use 
representations of the past for partisan political ends (Mink, 2008; Mink and Neumayer, 
2013). Memory games are:  
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              ‘the various ways by which political and social actors perceive and relate historical 
events, according to the identities they construct, the interests they defend and the strategies they 
devise to defend, maintain and improve their position in society’ (Mink and Neumayer, 2013, p. 4-
5) 
          Who are the actors of memory games? Mink refers to actors broadly as ‘various 
interest groups, political parties, or states’ (Mink, 2008, p. 469) ranging from ‘party leaders 
and activists’ to ‘elected officials (including members of parliament), journalists and 
judges’ (ibid., p. 478). Importantly, ‘militant historians’ constitute a separate subgroup 
according to Mink. These are professional historians, who use their expert status and, often 
working in governmental remembrance institutes, possess institutional resources to engage 
in partisan politics (ibid., p. 478, 486-487). In their other work, Mink and Neumayer (2013) 
differentiate actors of memory games further in a three-fold classification. Thus, 
institutional actors encompass the governments, political parties, and incumbents of public 
offices; ‘mobilized social groups’ refer to organized groups of former prisoners, ‘groups 
making pilgrimages to battlefields or martyrdom sites’; and, finally, professional groups 
of historians or journalists constitute the last layer of memory games’ actors (Mink and 
Neumayer, 2013, p. 5). 
          What unites the various actors involved in memory games is their willingness to use 
representations of the past for political agenda goals, may that be getting electoral support, 
obstructing political counterparts, or strengthening networks of supporters (Mink, 2008, p. 
472, 474, 476). Overall, memory actors take a stance regarding and using representations 
of the past as a part of their agenda. Mink points out the need for pursuing a reconciliatory 
agenda in the case of conflict-laden past at the all-European level or, in other words, 
mitigate harmful memory games. He argues in favor of a positive mnemonic agenda, in 
which various memory agents would engage in ‘developing memory resources and 
incorporating histroricising strategies into their action repertoires, the aim being to 
‘recycle’ representations of ‘painful’ pasts in current political issues and contests’ (ibid., 
p. 488)  
          Scholarship on commemorative practices provides another insight on memory 
agency. For instance, Yurchuk focuses on memory agents from the perspective of 
commemorative practices in modern Ukraine. In a study on the nationalist underground 
remembrance and monuments building, the author speaks about ‘memory actors’ or 
‘memory entrepreneurs’ as agents ‘who reinforce memory work’ on the ground (Yurchuk, 
2014, p. 8). Yurchuk understands memory entrepreneurs as ‘people, interest groups, 
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organizations and institutions which directly and strategically take some actions towards 
influencing the way the OUN and UPA are remembered’1 (ibid., 18-19). Her particular 
interest is in ‘who initiated the idea of the monument, who made decisions on its 
construction, and why it was built in a particular place at exactly that moment in time’ 
(ibid., p. 8). This approach helps to digest how and why various memory entrepreneurs 
(members of local and regional councils, the Orthodox Church clergy, activists and media) 
influence and frame construction of monuments commemorating the nationalist movement 
in Ukraine.  
          The most recent comprehensive attempt to outline who memory agents are and 
contextualize their ‘behavior’ belongs to Bernhard and Kubik (2014). Similarly to Mink, 
authors aim to conceptualize interplay between collective memory usage and politics. To 
do that, Bernhard and Kubik introduce an analytical framework that operates with the 
concepts of ‘mnemonic actor’ and ‘memory regime’.  
          Foremost, Bernhard and Kubik argue in favor the political science approach to 
memory studies with a focus on the ‘strategies that political actors employ to make others 
remember in certain, specific ways and the effects of such mnemonic manipulation’ 
(Bernhard and Kubik, 2014, p. 7). According to the authors, representation of the past in a 
particular society consists of a ‘set of discourses about the past’, which is negotiated, 
articulated and accepted in a certain version by broader society (ibid., p. 9). This means 
that various social groups hold with particular ‘historical memory’ as a sum of versions of 
the past (ibid.). 
          Furthermore, historical memory is interrelated with politics and political power 
dynamics. In this relation, Bernhard and Kubik argue that political actors play their role in 
historical memory construction as far as it is ‘also subject to manipulation on the basis of 
the self-interest of those in power and those contesting power’ (ibid., p. 9) 
          Bernhard and Kubik consider individuals, parties, and organizations as mnemonic 
actors and distinguish between mnemonic warriors, mnemonic pluralist, mnemonic 
abnegators and mnemonic prospectives (ibid., p. 12-15). Each category reflects the stance 
(strategy) taken by an actor when engaging in historical memory construction. Mnemonic 
warriors propagate vision of the past, which is seen as only legitimate and non-negotiable, 
and take assertive stance against other actors in ‘protecting’ their ‘true’ vision (ibid., p. 12-
                                                 
1 OUN and UPA refers to the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army existed in 
1930-1940s. See for more in Rudling (2011) and Katchanovski (2015) 
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13, 15). In the same time, pluralists allow accommodation of competing versions of the 
past in a society and prefer to engage in political dialogue over the past (ibid., p. 13, 15). 
Abnegators favor ‘mnemonic equilibrium’ and withdraw from politicizing historical issues 
(ibid., p. 14). And finally prospectives hold a directional view on historical development, 
and are interested in the past only to justify their politically oriented agenda of building a 
utopian future; they are futurists, who are disinterested in ‘defending’ a specific version of 
the past, but rather seek to justify their political agenda’s vision of the future by drawing 
from past historical experiences (ibid., p. 14, 15).   
          It is important to add that Bernhard and Kubik place specific emphasis on political 
actors as mnemonic actors who aim to construct official historical memory. In this relation, 
the authors note their interest in memory regimes ‘whose formulation and propagation 
involve the intensive participation of state institutions and/or political society (the 
authorities and major political actors such as parties, who are organized to hold and contest 
state power)’ (ibid., p. 16).  
          The notion of a memory agent has been explored in several case studies as well. 
These studies elucidate the role of memory agency in construction and representation of 
the past by focusing on particular societal contexts or cases.  
          Aguilar (1999) operates with the notion of ‘agents of memory’ to describe activities 
of disabled veterans’ organizations during and after the Spanish Civil War. According to 
Aguilar, veterans organizations had shaped different, usually competing narratives about 
their wartime experiences along the lines winners and losers of military conflict (1999, p. 
102-103). However, created to mourn the seemingly unforgivable traumatic past and 
sustain their members in the first place, veteran organizations of former Republicans 
became involved in reconciliatory processes to varying degrees in post-Franco’s Spain 
(ibid.). 
          Further, Budryte (2014) speaks of female politicians as memory agents in the context 
of post-Soviet Lithuania. Political activism of female victims of the Soviet repressions 
aimed at communicating their traumatic past is the main characteristic for defining them 
as ‘agents of memory’ (see Budryte, 2014, p. 55-56). Again, in Budryte’s study, taking 
part in shaping collective memory about the past points at a memory agent. Budryte 
understands memory agents as ‘active social and political groups, who may or may not be 
in opposition to the ruling elite’ but driven with a goal to ‘obtain greater currency for their 
version of memory’ (Budryte, 2014, p. 58). 
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          Finally, Pietraszewski and Törnquist-Plewa (2016) relate memory agents to memory 
narrative construction in a recent study on Wroclaw’s memory politics. Authors 
distinguish macro, meso, micro agents of memory acting to shift politics of memory at the 
local level. The European Union is an ‘institutional, supranational, transcultural agent of 
memory, which influences the local agents of memory in Wroclaw’ (Pietraszewski and 
Törnquist-Plewa, 2016, p. 41) primarily by pursuing agenda of multiculturalism and 
providing financial support to local memory agents. Meso and micro-level agents 
presented by national political and intellectual elites and local inhabitants respectively 
(ibid.). The underlying characteristic of memory agents in a study is that they all take part 
in the construction of memory narrative about Wroclaw’s past.  
          To sum up this section, the term memory agent commonly refers to a range of 
societal and political actors involved in collective (political) memory construction. 
Memory agents do have an agenda related to using representation of the past in partisan 
politics (‘historicising strategies’, ‘political uses of memory’), articulating specific 
historical experiences of a group, or in another feasible way relate themselves to collective 
(political) memory construction. Importantly, this thesis focuses on meso (national 
political elites) level of political memory construction in modern Ukraine. 
          Political elites represented by the governments, elected political incumbents and 
other state agents play a specific role as memory agents. The next section explores how 
and why political elites as memory agents engage in institutionalizing particular visions of 
the past. Defining their motives, strategies and tools will assist in clarifying and drawing 
conceptual boundaries of elite mythmaking as such.   
 
1.3. Elite mythmaking 
          Why do political elites engage into political memory construction? Political elites 
usually want to strengthen a groups’ identity, legitimize their policies and rule overall, or 
instrumentally use representations of the past to gain affective popular support (patriotism 
and loyalty).  
          From the nation-building standpoint, political rulers want to make sense of the past, 
find and ground origins of the ruled community. ‘Collective identities,’ as Misztal puts it, 
‘are seen as implying notions of group boundedness and homogeneity, and an emotional 
sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded group, involving both a felt solidarity with 
fellow group members and a felt difference from outsiders.’ (Misztal, 2003, p. 133). 
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According to Misztal, memory facilitates groups’ solidarity and feeling of belonging (ibid., 
p. 132-135) 
          Furthermore, Pääbo also links memory construction to the necessities of nation-
building and argues that nations structure and internalize ‘national history’ in the form of 
national master narratives (Pääbo, 2011, 43-52). In this light, ‘every nation-state has its 
commonly shared ideological understandings of national past, which defines the 
framework that nationally conscious individuals identify with’ (ibid., p. 45). Political 
elites, thus, are seen as agents of national ‘myths’ (narratives) production in the context of 
nation-states consolidation (ibid., p. 46, 52). For Pääbo, national master narratives 
legitimize and strengthen national identity foremost (ibid., p. 46-47). They help to make 
sense of the past for the emerging national community.  
          From an international relations point of view, political elites want not only to provide 
greater currency of national identity, but also legitimize their policy-making. ‘Mnemonic 
legitimation’ is a term used by Müller (2004, p. 26) to refer to transmitting of legitimacy 
on foreign policy. On the one hand, political elites use representations of the past for 
drawing ‘historical analogies’ manually in day-to-day decision-making (Müller, 2004, p. 
27). On the other, installed version of national memory itself informs the freedom to decide 
and conduct state policy. As Müller notes in this relation (ibid., p. 26), it ‘symbolically 
structures the political claim-making which is always both strategic and constitutive of 
politics, and effectively operates as a constraint in any given political culture by both 
proscribing and prescribing certain claims’. Therefore, memory influences states’ behavior 
internationally. Müller elaborates on the role of national memory in international relations 
further by stating ‘the point is that states react to shifts in the balance of power and the 
evolution of international institutions in ways which have been shaped by political culture 
– and memory in particular’ (ibid., p. 29). 
          Recent International Relations (IR) scholarship explores the nexus between memory 
and foreign policy further. The arguments hold that representation of the past embedded in 
‘stories that states tell of themselves’ transcends into foreign policy making (Subotic, 
2016) or that states want to address the issue of their ‘mnemonical security’ by legislating 
public remembrance (Mälksoo, 2015). In any case, political elites utilize representations 
of the past not only for domestic identity-building, but also to address political issues 
internationally.  
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          Subotic (2016) advances the argument that political elites address challenges on 
international arena by selectively employing, re-activating or de-activating, narratives 
about the past and their elements. Subotic conceptualizes shared collective memory as 
embedded in the ‘state narrative’. In this framework, historical experiences provide a 
ground for shaping state narrative by political elites in order to address challenging issues. 
Subotic argues that ‘groups need a narrative, a compelling story of where did “we” come 
from, how did we come to be who we are, what brings us together in a group, what purpose 
and aspirations does our group have’ (Subotic, 2016, p. 612). Thus, the state narrative is a 
coherent story of national past that helps to assess current foreign policy issues, strategic 
threats, and make policy choices (ibid., p. 612-613). Next, when facing drastic political 
challenge or insecurity, political elites tend to manipulate that ‘autobiographical’ state 
narrative to address the tension: 
               “… narratives are selectively activated to provide a cognitive bridge between policy 
change that resolves the physical security challenge (for example secession of territory), while also 
preserving state ontological security through providing autobiographical continuity, a sense of 
routine, and calm.” (ibid., p. 611) 
          Mälksoo (2015) introduces the notion of ‘mnemonical security’ as sub-layer of 
ontological security paradigm in IR. Her argument holds that states address the sense of 
‘ontological anxiety’ (2015, p. 226) by legislating historical remembrance practices (ibid., 
p. 222-223). For Mälksoo, national memory is the ‘backbone’ to a state’s narrative about 
itself, which is crucial for understanding behavior of particular states in international 
affairs (ibid., p. 224). In Mälksoo’s framework, ‘mnemonical security’ refers to the ‘idea 
that distinct understanding of the past should be fixed in public remembrance and 
consciousness in order to buttress an actor’s stable sense of self as the basis of its political 
agency’ (ibid., p. 222). However, after legislating a particular vision of the past, political 
elites are trapped in the need to re-affirm that version of it. In the case of conflict-laden 
pasts or mutually shared historical events shared between neighboring states, legislating 
remembrance inevitably spins insecurity further. As Mälksoo states, ‘the securitization of 
‘memory’ as the temporal core of a state’s biographical narrative leads eventually to new 
security dilemmas’ that in turn causes a ‘reduced sense of security among the competitive 
securitizers of issues of public remembrance in international politics’ (ibid., p. 222). 
          Finally, the last explanation for why political elites engage in political memory 
construction is the need for affective public support usually associated with notions of 
patriotism and loyalty. In this relation, Yinan He argues that constructing myths about the 
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past is instrumental, a manipulative tool of the ruling elites to foster national cohesion and 
patriotism (He, 2007, p. 51, 60). Simultaneously, this helps to strengthen domestic 
legitimacy of the ruling regime (ibid., p. 51, 55). Also, Liñán (2010) highlights the same 
unifying and legitimizing effects of public propaganda of narrated by elites country’s 
history.  
          The remaining question to address in this section is how political elites engage into 
political memory articulation and institutionalization. Essentially, answering this question 
will help to give meaning to the concept of elite mythmaking. 
          Miller (2012) approaches ‘the politicization of history’ as a part of theorizing 
‘historical politics’. According to Miller, in the context of political pluralization, post-
communist political regimes consolidate historical policies as a ‘set of practices concerning 
the political utilization of history’ (2012, p. 5). The political developments in Eastern 
Europe mark the emergence of historical politics as a phenomenon that integrates political 
actors, institutions (governmental and non-governmental), and methods of political usage 
of history and memory (ibid., p. 6-7). Moreover, Miller identifies institutional channels for 
how political elites in the region foster and institutionalize their representation of the past. 
Historical policy encompasses interference into the history curricula and the systems of 
public education, managing a list of Soviet totalitarian regime crimes for compensation 
claims, falsifying history museums with political agendas, and, finally, legislating 
representation of the past (ibid., p. 8, 9-10). And, the latter refers not to installation of 
commemorative days, but to the ‘laws establishing an interpretation of events as the only 
possible one’ as well as endorsing criminal liability for criticizing official version of the 
past (ibid., p. 11). 
          Moreover, Kasianov defines historical policy as a ‘social practice of using history 
and ‘historical’ memory in political activities with a goal of installing a version of 
representation of the past in social consciousness’ (Kasianov, 2014, p. 136). Also, 
according to Kasianov’s other definition (2016, p. 28), historical policy is two-dimensional 
– it entails ‘deliberate construction’ as well as ‘utilitarian usage’ of representation of the 
past.  
          Historical policy is inherently political. It implies ‘political instrumentalization’ of 
representing the past that means its application in ‘politics, ideological debates, legal and 
legislative practices, diplomatic, and military conflicts’ (2014, p. 136). Kasianov points 
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out getting popular loyalty of large social groups as the ultimate goal of historical policy; 
and implies that loyalty means imposing durable dominance over groups (2016, p. 29).  
          Political elites may also engage crude administrative practices for preferable 
representation of the past. Lagrou (1999; 2003) addresses relations between public 
remembrance and official ‘policies of memory’ in fostering the image of the Resistance to 
the Nazi occupation in post-1945 Western Europe. In discussed among others the Dutch 
case, governmental administrative policy took form of ostracizing veterans’ organizations 
by depriving veterans of military awards and public commemorations (2003, p. 535-536). 
In addition, regulation of the war monuments erection by the official governmental 
committee has homogenized the country’s memory landscape (1999, p. 72-73; 2003, p. 
536). An altogether strict administrative policy in the Netherlands has unified 
representation of the wartime past and, as Lagrou argues, successfully implemented the 
image of national resistance.  
          ‘National’ or ‘elite’ mythmaking is a term preferred by Y. He to describe elite—
driven manipulation of the past (2007, p. 44, 47; 2009, p. 25-30). In her seminal article, 
He identifies institutional channels of myth construction. Political elites in power tend to 
obtain hegemonic control over ‘the institutional tools of memory construction, including 
school textbooks, museums and commemorative rituals, and post-conflict resolution 
measures, including war compensation programs’ (He, 2007, p. 47; see also He, 2009, p. 
28-29). As He argues (2007), the ability to exercise unilateral control over mentioned 
channels means achieving success in installing that political elite’s version of the past.  
          By and large, elite mythmaking refers to a process of institutionalizing a particular 
vision of the past; it entails a set of public practices, usually administrative and legislative, 
by which political elites install preferable representation of the past. Elite mythmaking is 
constitutive to political elites as memory agents possessing necessary power, resources and 
outreach to construct and articulate their vision of the past. If mythmaking is a process, 
then political memory is its outcome or, in other words, an institutionalized in various 
cultural forms vision of the past. Finally, elite mythmaking has a number of 
complementary goals behind. In one way or another, political elites want to strengthen the 
national identity, legitimize states’ agency in international affairs, or facilitate affective 
popular support.  
          The next section reviews the notion of a narrative, and speaks of narratives in 
connection to collective memory. It concludes a theoretical chapter of the MA thesis. 
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1.4. Narratives           
          Somers and Gibson (1994) suggest that narratives constitute a foundation of social 
life as far as the latter is always ‘storied’ or, in other words, organized and framed in the 
form of a story. They develop their framework upon the premise that:  
               ‘people construct identities (however multiple and changing) by locating themselves or 
being located within a repertoire of emplotted stories … that people make sense of what has 
happened and is happening to them by attempting to assemble or in some way integrate these 
happenings within one or more narratives’ (1994, p. 2)  
           In turn, having structured various experiences in coherent stories, actors then act on 
the basis of designed narratives. Therefore, Somers and Gibson argue about defining role 
of narratives by employing which ‘we come to know, understand, and make sense of the 
social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social 
identities’ (ibid., p. 27). 
          Somers and Gibson conceptualize the narrative through delineating a number of its 
crucial features. ‘Narratives are,’ they state, ‘constellations of relationships (connected 
parts) embedded in time and space, constituted by causal emplotment’ (ibid., p. 27, italics 
in original). Narrative implies sequential structure and ‘renders understanding only by 
connecting (however unstably) parts to a constructed configuration or a social network 
(however incoherent or unrealizable) composed of symbolic, institutional, and material 
practices’ (ibid., p. 28).  
          The connection between parts means that in a narrative disparate ‘events’ are turned 
into ‘episodes’ according to certain plot-lines (causal emplotment), that unites anteceding 
and proceeding episodes (ibid., p. 28). Emplotment assembles parts of a story in a coherent 
manner, it ‘allows us to construct a significant network or configuration of relationships’ 
between the episodes (ibid., p. 29). Moreover, narratives are characterized by ‘selective 
appropriation’ meaning that they prioritize and emphasize one event over the other (ibid., 
p. 29). Finally, temporality and ‘space’ refer to positioning of elements of the plot to each 
other (ibid., p. 28). 
          Furthermore, Somers and Gibson outline four-fold classification of narratives (ibid., 
p. 29-33). Foremost, ‘ontological narratives’ refer to the most foundational stories that 
provide social actors with an understanding of self. Importantly, ‘what to do’ always 
follows ‘who we are’ (ibid., p. 30). This means that ontological narratives ‘locate’ social 
actors on the one hand and serve the basis for the agency in social relations on the other. 
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Importantly, ontological narratives draw from the ‘pubic narratives’. The latter refers to 
those stories that are ‘attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than single 
individuals’ (ibid., p. 31). Institutions and social formations (churches, governments and 
nations) shape the public narratives (ibid.). Finally, Somers and Gibson differentiate 
between conceptual narratives as shaped by social sciences academia and meta-narratives 
as the most abstract pertaining in their meaning to universal forces governing social change 
(ibid., p. 32-33).  
          Patterson and Monroe (1998) argue about defining role of narratives in structuring 
political reality around. Narrative is a ‘story’ that sutures perceptions of events in a 
coherent fashion and, thus, affects the political behavior of individuals (ibid., p. 315, 319). 
They are, as Patterson and Monroe note, ‘especially useful in revealing the speaker’s 
concept of self, for it is the self is located at the center of the narrative, whether as active 
agent, passive experiencer, or tool of destiny’ (ibid., p. 316). Furthermore, narratives fulfill 
several complementary goals varying from identifying a pattern from distinct events, to 
providing a sense of positioning and purpose for groups, to being powerful tools for 
interpreting social relations (ibid., p. 319, 321-322).  
          The considerable amount of theorizing on narratives in relation to collective memory 
and remembrance belongs to James Wertsch (2002; 2008a; 2008b). His argument, if putted 
simply, states that narratives mediate collective memory by being ‘cultural tools’ of the 
representation of the past in particular societal and cultural contexts (2008a, p. 139). 
Representation of the past as such follows a narrative structure; it is organized in the form 
of story about events of the past (2008b, p. 123-124).  
           Furthermore, Wertsch differentiates between specific narratives focusing on 
particular settings, events and characters on the one hand, and ‘schematic narrative 
templates’ (2008a; 2008b) on the other. The latter is an analytical category that helps to 
delineate an underlying plot of a group's history within a set of events.  Schematic narrative 
templates involve a high level of abstraction and provide ‘a pattern that is applied to 
multiple events, thereby creating specific narratives’ (2008a, p. 142). In particular, national 
narratives do have such a structure when constructing national history and generalizing 
over a set of events across time. As Wertsch argues, schematic templates ‘produce replicas 
that vary in their details but reflect a single general story line …. these templates do not 
deal with just one concrete episode from the past’ but rather present overarching models 
for representation of the past (2008b, p. 123).  
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          Generally speaking, schematic narrative templates allow and inform representing 
events of the past in coherent fashion and because of their abstract nature retain deep 
identity-related emotional appeal (2008a, p. 142). Basically, as Wertsch implies (2008b, p. 
123), any study of collective memory is an enquiry into schematic narrative templates as 
the underlying patterns beyond distinct representations of the past. 
          Conceptualizing schematic narrative templates has originated from studying World 
War Two (WW2) remembrance. In this relation, Wertsch has explored the schematic 
template of Russian history. His core argument is that representation of WW2 in post-
Soviet Russia follows an ‘expulsion of foreign enemies’ template. This template has a four-
fold structure and encompasses the image of Russia as a) peaceful nation; b) viciously and 
savagely attacked from abroad; c) almost defeated; d) however, due to unprecedented 
people’s mobilization and heroism, it was able to eliminate the foreign enemy (2002, p. 
156; 2007, p. 30). According to Wertsch (2007, p. 30), the template replicates itself in 
specific narratives of Russia’s history even unrelated to WW2. Also, Wertsch has found 
transition of the template between Soviet and pluralist post-Soviet accounts on WW2 
history in Russia (2002, p. 105-115; 2007, p. 30-31).  
          To sum up, narratives play a crucial role in structuring political reality and revealing 
the notion of self for various social actors. They also provide a basis for political action by 
making sense of experiences, situating actors in broader social framework and prescribing 
actions. In relation to collective memory, narratives make it possible to communicate 
events of the past in a structured and accessible form. 
 
          The theoretical chapter of this MA thesis has scrutinized four conceptual categories 
stemming from various scholarship in memory studies. It was intended to develop the 
conceptual argument that political elites as memory agents engage in construction of 
political memory (mythmaking) by framing narratives about the past.  
          The next chapter illustrates the application of the conceptual argument to the case of 
the World War Two (WW2) representation in modern Ukraine. In the second chapter, I 
first discuss the European dimension of WW2 representation. Then, I proceed with a 
discussion of memory politics in modern Ukraine by differentiating between and 
contrasting post-Soviet (1991-2014) and post-Euromaidan (2014) periods. In the section 
devoted to trajectories of memory politics in Ukraine, I introduce my core thesis regarding 
elite-mythmaking in post-2014 Ukraine and its newly forged narrative. The argument 
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holds that in the latter period elite-mythmaking by memory agents creates a representation 
of WW2 by selectively ‘Europeanizing’ Ukraine’s narrative about the war. 
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2. European discourse on WW2 and trajectories of memory politics in modern 
Ukraine  
 
          The following chapter has a three-fold structure. In the first section, I outline what 
can be called the European discourse(s) on WW2 or ‘European memory’ of the 20th 
century. The second and third sections will proceed with a discussion of the developments 
of memory politics in modern Ukraine. This is a need to position Ukraine’s memory 
politics against a backdrop of European discourse on WW2 that defines this chapter’s 
structure. Importantly, the second section introduces the main thesis – the elite-
mythmaking argument on World War 2 representation in post-Euromaidan Ukraine.  
 
2.1. European discourses on WW2 
          Pakier and Strath (2010) contemplate over the notion of European memory. Under 
the  authors’ scrutiny is the prospect for a ‘European viewpoint’ on events and issues 
largely pertaining to World War 2. According to Pakier and Strath, two fault lines 
characterize reflections on WW2 in post-war Europe. On the one hand, a temporal fault 
line, which emerges in post-1945 Europe, takes the end of the war as a ‘new zero hour’ for 
framing the past, and is encapsulated in ‘Never Again’ reasoning (Pakier and Strath, 2010, 
p. 2-3). On the other, the spatial fault line refers to West-East cleavage of remembrance 
prior to 1989 (ibid.). In this relation, the late 1980s mark a thematic shift in war 
interpretation ‘from heroism to collaboration’ which is characterized, with some 
reservations, as a more ‘critical confrontation with idealized and heroic national pasts’ 
(ibid., p. 3).  
          This ‘critical confrontation’ or ‘coming to terms with the past’ constitutes the 
defining characteristic of European discourse on WW2. In Pakier and Strath’s view, the 
‘Europeanization’ of memory, thus, means ‘parallel processes of coming to terms with the 
past and contentious negotiation about what to remember and what to forget’ (ibid., p. 11). 
Thematically, Europeanization brings uncomfortable ‘dark pasts’ under public scrutiny 
(ibid., p. 14) and implies ‘efforts to establish transnational self-critical memory discourses 
on colonialism, racism and war collaboration in Europe’ (ibid., p. 12). 
          Moreover, Müller takes a two-fold approach to defining ‘Europeanization’ of 
representation of the past. Foremost, the emergence of ‘self-critical European memory’ 
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refers to ‘moral-political attitudes and practices’, by which European countries ‘work 
through’ national pasts (Müller, 2010, p. 26-27). More specifically, the process means 
there is a willingness to critically engage with national past as well as to ‘assume collective 
responsibility for past misdeeds and engage in public acts of atonement’ from behalf of 
nation-states and political elites (ibid., p. 27). The other way to approach Europeanization 
of memory is to consider it as a process of producing similar in content transnational 
European memory, in which European countries homogenize representation of their pasts 
in a unified framework (ibid., p. 26-27). The inspiration behind forging a common 
collective memory, and scrutinizing national ‘dark pasts’ in particular, is a pursuit of 
‘common political culture in the process of arguing about these pasts’ (ibid., p. 28). 
          The Holocaust memory is an important stage of emerging European memory of 
WW2. In this relation, Müller notes that ‘a pattern seems to have emerged according to 
which individual European nations acknowledge their role in the Holocaust, while at the 
same time affirming its ‘universal significance’’ (ibid., p. 31). Importantly, Müller also 
argues about the emergence of a ‘common language of guilt’ in relation to the past, which 
does not, however, preclude ‘national collective memories’ from being ‘heterogeneous and 
discontinuous’ (p. 32). In other words, Müller argues that Europeanization of collective 
memories refers to practicing the ‘politics of regret’ and engaging in practices of critical 
reevaluation of national past (ibid., p. 27). This process does not necessarily imply creation 
of ‘thick’, or similar in content, European memory, but it rather may imply cultivation of 
‘thin’ transnational memory with such practices in its core (ibid., p. 32).  
          In a similar fashion, Lebow (2006) points out the critical character of representing 
WW2 as a part of post-war memory politics in Europe. After some period of whitewashing 
memory politics, in which ‘the initial response of postwar elites everywhere was to portray 
their countries and citizens as victims’ (Lebow, 2006, p. 21), comes a self-critical stage of 
representation of the past. Since the end of the war, as Lebow states, ‘almost every country 
has undergone some kind of wrenching public debate about its role(s) in that conflict and 
the atrocities for which its government or nationals were responsible’ (ibid., p. 21). 
Moreover, Lebow structures ‘coming to terms with the past’ in Western European societies 
around two topics. The first, similarly to Müller’s reasoning, pertains to national histories 
and encompasses ‘attempts to incorporate ‘dark’ periods of history, formerly blocked off 
and even repressed as anomalous, into national history and consciousness’ (ibid., p. 35). 
The second focuses exclusively on the Holocaust in national past and encompasses 
‘attempts to confront participation in the Holocaust and, more generally, the prewar, 
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wartime, and postwar treatment of Jews and other persecuted minorities in one’s country’ 
(ibid., p. 35). 
          The resolutions of the European Parliament as the major representative institution at 
the European level may serve as a reflection of European discourse on WW2 as well. The 
high-profile international documents usually focus on totalitarian regimes condemnation 
in common Europe-wide framework of remembrance. 
          The European Parliament (EP) in the Resolution on ‘European Conscience and 
Totalitarianism’ (2009) has outlined the framework of WW2 remembrance by cultivating 
condemnation of historical totalitarian regimes and stressed the need to ‘honour the 
victims, condemn the perpetrators and lay the foundations for reconciliation based on truth 
and remembrance’ (European Parliament, 2009, F). The resolution considers victims of 
state-perpetrated violence as a core of common European mourning and remembrance 
while acknowledging the ‘uniqueness of the Holocaust’ (ibid., G). Importantly, totalitarian 
regimes are seen as main protagonists of tragic 20th century pertaining to the events of 
WW2 as well, and, therefore, worth condemnation (ibid., sections H, I, J, K, L). On the 
level of policy prescriptions, the European Parliament focuses on victims and crimes of 
‘totalitarian and undemocratic regimes’ by stating respect for the victims and calls for 
‘truth and remembrance’ (ibid., § 1, 3). Moreover, the resolution calls for barring any 
restrictions on access to historical documents in the archives of member states and 
establishes August 23 as European Day of Remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian 
and authoritarian regimes (ibid., § 6, 15). 
          The similar pattern of totalitarian regimes condemnation for WW2 and horrific 
historical events may be found in other international organizations documents (see e.g. 
OSCE, 2009). In this relation, the European Parliament’s Declaration on the ‘European 
Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism’ (2008) is particularly 
revealing. The Declaration has condemned the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany for the 
outbreak of WW2 (EP, 2008, A). Also, it has stated that the ‘mass deportations, murders 
and enslavements committed in the context of the acts of aggression by Stalinism and 
Nazism fall into category of war crimes and crimes against humanity’ (ibid., B). In other 
words, state-perpetrated violence is considered to be legitimate and integral part of WW2 
remembrance.  
          The critical character of European discourse of WW2 does not preclude regional 
variation in how war is represented and remembered. Scholars usually differentiate 
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between four different memory discourses on the Second Word War (Mälksoo, 2009; 
Siddi, 2016). According to the argument, each discourse encapsulates a narrative regarding 
the war and can be identified in Europe’s regions. Due to different historical experiences, 
especially with regard to the Soviet Union’s role in WW2, those official discourses possess 
varying degrees of conflict potential (see e.g. Siddi, 2016). Furthermore, Karner and 
Mertens (2013) approach European discourse on WW2 by gathering case studies for their 
edited volume. They similarly note the persistent role of ‘national contexts’ or ‘nation-
focused frameworks of memory’ in representation of WW2 in contemporary politics 
(Karner and Mertens, 2013, p. 7-9).   
          Siddi (2016) has outlined four official memory discourses and investigated the 
interplay between them in recent commemorative developments. According to Siddi 
(2016, p. 4), the Western European and German narratives are placed closely as similar in 
elevating Nazi war crimes, and memorializing the Holocaust particularly, in official 
memory politics. However, in the former’s case, representing underground resistance to 
the Nazis becomes central for national resistance myths ‘as the emblem of national rebirth 
during the occupation’ (Siddi, 2016, p. 4). Furthermore, the Central European narrative by 
is preoccupied with addressing Soviet totalitarianism and national suffering and tends to 
equate Soviet and Nazi regimes on the one hand (ibid., p. 5). On the other, it downplays 
issues of local collaboration in the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes (ibid.). Finally, 
Russia’s narrative is a continuation of Soviet practice on victory celebration. Obviously, 
the Soviet Union’s wartime crimes as well as ‘subjugation of East-Central Europe after 
1945 are excluded from this grandiose narrative’ (ibid., p. 5). Importantly, WW2 narratives 
imply varying degrees of conflict potential according to Siddi. If the Western European 
and German narratives can be accommodated, then East-Central European and Russian are 
highly contested mutually due to different interpretations of the Soviet Union’s role in the 
Second World War (ibid., p 5-7). In general, Siddi notes a tendency towards ‘crystallising 
fragmentation’ among official memory narratives representing WW2 aggravated by 
‘tensions about current affairs’ internationally (ibid., p. 10-11). This is especially true, as 
Siddi argues, in the case of opposing East-Central European and modern Russian narratives 
(ibid., p. 11).  
          The interplay between narratives on WW2 manifests itself not only in opposition 
between Russian and East-Central European discourses, but also in seeking recognition for 
the latter’s perspectives on war in a common European remembrance framework 
(Mälksoo, 2009; Neumayer, 2015). In this relation, Mälksoo argues about the quest of 
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‘subaltern’ Polish and the Baltics states’ narratives for symbolic recognition as a part of 
war remembrance at the all-European level (Mälksoo, 2009, p. 654). Foreign policy actions 
of the respective states have pursued the official condemnation of Soviet totalitarian regime 
crimes in particular (ibid., p. 654-656). Paradoxically, these ‘memory-political endeavors’ 
to fracture European WW2 remembrance is still seen by its agents as ‘assuming the real 
possibility of a unified and coherent common European remembrance of the war in the 
first place’ (ibid., p. 657).  
          Moreover, Mälksoo has elaborated on the defining features of ECE historical 
narrative in the context of her study as compared with Western European and German 
representations. According to Mälksoo (2009, p. 661-663), in the Polish and Baltics 
contexts, this historical narrative is encapsulated in:  
a) Emphasis on communist regimes’ crimes; 
b) Notion of ‘Yalta betrayal’ prescribing Europe’s ‘obligation to remember’ the 
distinct Eastern European  wartime experiences, and also imposition of communism 
by the Soviet Uniob; 
c) ‘comparative martyrology’ meaning centrality of national ‘self-attributed 
martydom’ and victimhood inflicted by the war and Soviet Union (2009, p. 663); 
d) Downplaying the significance of the Holocaust, or, in the words of Mälksoo, the 
tendency to downplay ‘the sufferings of others as if empathizing with the sufferings 
of the others would reduce one’s own relative suffering’ (2009, p. 663) 
           Similarly to Mälksoo, Neumayer (2015) speaks of the same centrality of communist 
crimes to the ECE narrative. According to her research, the post-communist members of 
the EU (‘memory entrepreneurs’) have institutionalized the ‘crimes of communism’ 
narrative using the available institutional means after joining the European Union at the 
supranational level (Neumayer, 2015, p. 3-7, 13-17). 
          To sum up this section, a critical, or in other words ‘coming to terms with the past’, 
characteristic defines European framing and representation of WW2. Thematically, this 
means focusing on national ‘dark pasts’ of collaboration, exclusionary policies, ethnic 
cleansing and other misdeeds when narrating national histories. Also, the bottom-line of 
the discourse is a condemnation of historical totalitarian regimes and cultivating the 
foundational role of the Holocaust for modern WW2 remembrance as the most notoriously 
unique event in human history. Nonetheless, ‘European memory’ of WW2 does not 
preclude regional variation. In a strict sense of the term, European discourse refers to the 
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Western European narratives on WW2, whereas East-Central European narratives diverge 
in choosing the main topics and themes in their WW2 remembrance. One fault-line is 
especially relevant for this thesis. The Russian-Soviet narrative of victory celebration and 
its glorification is seen to be at odds with other European narratives of WW2 
representation, in as far as they have had a critical reevaluation of their national histories 
and made mourning as central elements of the representation of war.  
  
2.2. Trajectories of memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine 
          The ‘swinging pendulum’ is the best term to describe intricacy of memory politics 
in post-Soviet Ukraine. Usually, Ukraine is characterized as a ‘divided’ society with 
fragmented collective memory and highly contested nature of debates pertaining to the 
issues of collective memory and identity (see e.g. Shevel, 2011). Governmental memory 
politics of changing incumbents has reflected this ‘divided’ nature of collective memory 
in Ukraine. This section reviews a ‘swinging’ nature of governmental memory politics in 
post-Soviet Ukraine (1991-2014) relying on existing and well-established scholarly 
literature. Thereafter, I proceed with a discussion of drastic elite-mythmaking insurgency 
taking place in post-2014th Ukraine. 
          My core argument is that post-2014 Ukraine is a blatant case of elite-mythmaking 
pertaining to WW2 remembrance that encompasses a range of legislative, administrative 
and commemorative measures and practices. In contrast to the often ambivalent, as well 
as highly contested and reversible, memory politics in post-Soviet Ukraine (1991-2014), 
current memory agents pursue a coherent memory politics strategy pertaining to WW2 
representation. In post-Euromaidan Ukraine, the President, the Ukrainian Institute of 
National Remembrance (UINR) and the Parliament (MPs) negotiate, construct and install 
political memory of WW2 by decisively alienating the Soviet past on the one hand, and 
selectively ‘Europeanizing’ Ukraine’s narrative of WW2 and it’s elements on the other.  
          The newly forged narrative itself antagonizes the role and image of the Soviet Union 
in the war, and Ukraine’s Soviet past on the one hand. It disregards the Soviet 
interpretations of the war as ‘mythological’, invalid, and imposed. On the other hand, the 
narrative forges a preferable image of stateless Ukrainians and of the anti-Soviet Ukrainian 
nationalist underground in particular. The narrative essentializes Ukrainians as a coherent 
protagonist of the war. Finally, it takes an ambivalent stance with regard to the Holocaust 
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as well as obstructs the local ‘dark past’2. In other words, the narrative essentially adopts 
characteristics of the Eastern Central European (ECE) historical narrative on WW2.  
          Legislative and administrative practices on the representation of the past in post-
Soviet Ukraine reflect moving back and forth in installing the more 'nationalized' vision of 
WW2 by downplaying the ‘Great Patriotic War’ narrative and vice versa. In other words, 
swinging from the one side of memory politics the pendulum to the other. The sides of 
pendulum are preserving the ‘Great Patriotic War’ in legislation and commemoration or 
moving to WW2 remembrance while simultaneously providing a dimension for Ukrainian 
wartime nationalists’ recognition. Both imply different foreign policy orientations towards 
either integration of post-Soviet space or into the European Union.  
          In his analysis, Kasianov proposes to structure discussion over memory politics in 
post-Soviet Ukraine by conceptualizing and distinguishing between the ‘Soviet-nostalgic’ 
and ‘national’ narratives (Kasianov, 2016). The former term captures the significance of 
the ‘Great Patriotic War’ primarily inherited from the Soviet regimes’ discourses, practices 
and rituals (ibid., p. 28-30). Whereas, the ‘national’ refers to emerging national Ukrainian 
narratives of heroism and victimhood, encoded in new ‘historical myths, memory sites and 
sacred symbols’ (ibid., p. 28). Competition between those two narratives characterizes the 
political struggle over the representation of the past in post-Soviet Ukraine’s 
governmental, legislative and commemorative practices according to Kasianov (ibid.). 
Throughout the paper, Kasianov implies that this is dependence of the trajectory of 
memory politics from the incumbent government in Ukraine, which is the most important 
to understand its collective memory dynamics. In fact, changing governments have 
emphasized, exploited and institutionalized in legislative and administrative practices the 
‘Soviet-nostalgic’ or the ‘national’ narrative, or even the peculiar combination of both 
(ibid., p. 30-35). 
          Among other legislative initiatives, Kasianov (2016) discusses the case of adoption, 
deliberation and cancellation of the Law on the “Victory Flag” in Ukraine. In our view, 
this case exemplifies the pendulum nature of official memory politics in post-Soviet 
Ukraine and, thus, is worth particular attention.  
          In late April 2011, Parliament led by the Party of Regions and the communist 
(Communist Party of Ukraine) majority adopted the official usage of the red flag in 
approaching celebrations in May. President V. Yanukovych had signed the law and it 
                                                 
2 See more on Ukrainian context in the section ‘Key events’ of the third chapter of this thesis 
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entered into force before celebrations in May.  The law defined the red Flag of Victory as 
a ‘symbol of victory of the Soviet people, its army and fleet, over the fascist Germany in 
the Great Patriotic War’ (Law, 2011, § 1, Article 1). Article 1 of the Law also prescribed 
to use replicas of the red flag together with the national one during any official event 
pertaining to commemoration of the war by public bodies, local self-government officials, 
and other organizations or civil associations (§ 2, Article 1).  
          However, such a drastic institutionalization of a Soviet-era symbol by the governing 
party caused a conflict-laden societal backlash (Kasianov, 2016; Korostelina, 2014, p. 58-
65), as well as led the opposition MPs to file a motion before the Constitutional Court. In 
mid-June 2011, the Court had proclaimed unconstitutional provision of the Law on public 
usage of red flags together with the national Ukrainian flag. In the Decision (CCU, 2011, 
§ 3.3), the Court decided that national symbols constitute a closed-ended list as defined in 
the Constitution, and that changing the procedure of their display requires constitutional 
(2/3) majority and not adopting ordinary law. Furthermore, the red Victory Flag as such 
does not belong to national symbols and, thus, should not be displayed with the national 
ones without alternating their ‘constitutional value’ (ibid., § 3.3, 4). 
          In a similar fashion, Shevel distinguishes between antagonistic political camps of 
nationalists and ‘unreformed’ communists, who have pursued their competing legislative 
agendas on WW2 remembrance throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s (Shevel, 2011, 
p. 147-155). For instance, Shevel has identified 23 legislative attempts to grant recognition 
to Ukrainian wartime nationalists (OUN and UPA) between 2000 and 2010 (ibid., p. 151-
153). The surge of attempts made by President V. Yuschenko in 2005, who favored such 
recognition, has not been successful due to contestation in Parliament and even due to 
opposition within the presidential faction (ibid.). As the two examples show, attempts to 
drastically change memory politics by legislative tools were contested or even reversed in 
Ukraine by competing agents throughout the two post-Soviet decades. 
          Portnov (2013) uses the term ‘memory wars’ to describe memory politics in post-
Soviet Ukraine. In his account on ‘symbolic politics’ of the first three presidents of 
Ukraine3, Portnov points out ambivalence and situational dependence of presidents’ 
rhetorical strategies in representing the past (2013, p. 238-239, 243). These strategies 
usually incorporated Soviet symbols with national Ukrainian discourses in the search of a 
common historical narrative. Importantly, Portnov argues that essentially improvised 
                                                 
3 Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994), Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005), Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) 
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symbolic politics of the presidents has never been successful due to existing cleavages in 
the Ukrainian society (ibid., p.. 233, 247-248). Therefore, post-Soviet Ukraine’s political 
elites did not develop a ‘single, united national historical narrative’, but rather confined 
themselves to ‘nationalist’ or ‘Soviet alike’ narratives in representation of the past and 
WW2 (ibid., p. 247-248).  
          In a line with Portnov’s reasoning, Klymenko has found the pattern in how Ukrainian 
presidents addressed WW2 in her analysis of presidents’ commemorative speeches on 
Victory Day. According to her findings, presidents of post-Soviet Ukraine4 have 
represented WW2 in a way to ‘satisfy all members of the Ukrainian community who have 
various experiences of the war’ and ‘ambivalently combine diverse synchronic and 
diachronic discourses by referring to both the Great Patriotic War and World War 2’ 
(Klymenko, 2015, p. 398). As Klymenko shows (ibid., p. 394, 398), the usage of competing 
terms is linked to foreign policy orientations of the respective presidents towards more 
integration in the post-Soviet space (L. Kuchma, V. Yanukovych) or European Union (V. 
Yushchenko). Still, there is a great deal of continuity in presidential commemorative 
speeches. In fact, no one has decisively abrogated one of the competing narratives about 
WW2, but rather added new aspects and themes (ibid., p. 398-399). 
          Finally, Yurchuk delineates the whole range of premises that have defined ‘memory 
work’ in post-Soviet Ukraine. In addition to pluralization of memory related to democratic 
transition, Ukraine’s case encompasses important dimensions of de-Sovietization, 
decolonization, and nationalization (Yurchuk, 2014, p. 65). Under the latter three terms, 
Yurchuk understands the interrelated process of distancing from the Soviet past, or ‘Soviet 
legacies’ and symbols in her words, creating more space for genuinely ‘Ukrainian’ and 
‘post-colonial perspectives on history’ (ibid., p. 65, 76).  
          Having focused on memory of the Ukrainian wartime nationalists (‘Ukrainian’ 
perspective), Yurchuk distinguishes between several stages of memory politics regarding 
the issue. If the 1990s was characterized by a ‘relative vacuum’ of governmental memory 
politics, which enabled revival of social memory about WW2, then the mid-2000s marked 
a more assertive stance over introducing memory about the nationalists at the official level 
(discussed in ibid., p. 83, 102). In this relation, Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency (2005-
2010) had brought not only ‘normalization’ of the topic, but also the first measures to 
institutionalize memory about Ukrainian wartime nationalists (ibid., p 126). As Yurchuk’s 
                                                 
4 Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005), Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010), Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014) 
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research shows, Yuschenko’s memory politics mainly pursued joint celebrations of May 9 
(Victory Day) by both Red Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA’s) veterans, 
establishing the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (2006), and awarding the 
Order of the Hero of Ukraine to prominent nationalists posthumously5 (ibid., p. 127-128; 
also see more in Rudling, 2010). Importantly, Yuschenko did not try to undermine and 
substitute the Soviet-era heroics of the Red Army, but rather to combine the heroics of the 
Red Army and UPA at the official level in his pursuit of a more national Ukrainian 
perspective on history (Yurchuk, 2014, p. 127).   
          However, these discrete memory politics measures of President Yuschenko with 
regard to commemorating Ukrainian wartime nationalists has largely failed. On the one 
hand, the installation of joint celebrations, as Yurchuk notes (ibid., p. 127), was not 
successful at the national level. On the other hand, succeeding President Viktor 
Yanukovych (2010-2014) embraced a ‘restorational’ narrative of the ‘Great Patriotic War’, 
diminished the executive significance of UINR, while the judicial system challenged the 
awarding of Order to wartime nationalist (ibid., p. 132-133, 141-142; see also in Kasianov, 
2015, p. 200-206). 
          Schools’ curriculum and history education reflect attempts to incorporate new 
elements in representation of Ukraine’s past. In this relation, Klymenko (2014) has 
identified attempts to reframe the narrative of WW2 in her analysis of history schools’ 
textbooks dated by 2005-2006 already. According to the author, this reframing 
substantiates the Ukrainian perspective on WW2 in the triangle of ‘de-Sovietization, 
nationalization and Europeanization’ (2014, p. 757). Klymenko has identified ‘key 
themes’, around which Ukraine’s WW2 narrative is organized. She argues that the schools’ 
narrative, on the one hand, emphasizes equal criminality of the Soviet and Nazi regimes, 
and takes an ambiguous stance regarding the Red Army as both ‘liberators’ and ‘occupiers’ 
(ibid., p. 765, 772). On the other hand, it introduces a Ukrainian national dimension by 
elevating Ukrainian wartime nationalists as ‘fighters for independence’ while 
simultaneously obfuscating topics of the Holocaust and collaboration (ibid., p. 770, 765-
768, 772). Furthermore, the narrative regarding Ukrainian wartime nationalists presents 
timid attempts to incorporate the nationalists’ past into the curriculum and to somehow 
‘reconcile the Ukrainian nation’ (ibid., p. 770). However, Klymenko has noted that in 
2005-2006 textbooks ‘present the OUN and UPA as controversial figures, but more as 
                                                 
5 The nationalist is Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), See for more 
discussion over controversies around mentioned historical figure in Rossolinski-Liebe, 2014  
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fighters for Ukraine’s independence’ (ibid., p. 770). As such, the narrative contains 
elements of heroization and victimization concurrent with the necessity to provide a 
‘cohesive narrative’ of war and ‘create a common national identity among young 
Ukrainians’ (ibid., p. 772).  
          When discussing the impact of those textbooks, it is important to keep in mind the 
differentiation between the dimensions of formal schooling and family stories. The latter, 
as Richardson shows (2004), may challenge public schools’ narrative of WW2. 
Additionally, regional factors, or ‘regional political cultures’ in the words of Katchanovski, 
do determine attitudes towards WW2, and the wartime sides in particular (the Red Army, 
OUN and UPA), in modern Ukraine (Katchanovski, 2014, 2015).  
 
2.3. Elite-mythmaking in post-Euromaidan Ukraine 
           Political developments in Ukraine and the Euromaidan revolution of 2014 placed  
new importance on official memory politics. Representation of WW2 as well as of 
Ukraine’s Soviet past fell under unprecedented legislative and administrative scrutiny. The 
elite-mythmaking in post-Euromaidan Ukraine took the form of legislating historical 
remembrance and fostering commemoration of WW2 by administrative measures of public 
bodies and officials. The recent legislation and administrative decisions provide evidence 
of how the alienation from the Soviet past and establishing WW2 framework has been 
institutionalized and framed. 
          Foremost, the four ‘de-communization’ laws adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament 
on April 9, 2015 have established an official legal framework on representation of WW2. 
The Law “On Perpetuation of the Victory over Nazism” (2015b) establishes the time frame 
of war as 1939-1945 as well as adopting the official usage of ‘World War 2’ (Article 1). 
The law speaks about the ‘reverent attitude’ as a duty of the Ukrainian state and its citizens 
towards ‘the war veterans, participants of the Ukrainian liberation movement and victims 
of the Nazism’ (§ 1, Article 1). It has also installed two commemorative days. On the one 
hand, Memorial and Reconciliation Day was proclaimed to be commemorated annually on 
May 8 as the Day of ‘all victims of World War 2 of 1939-1945 in Ukraine’ (§ 2, Article 
1). On the other, the law reframes May 9 as a ‘national holiday the day of victory over 
Nazism in World War 2 (Victory Day)’ (§ 3, Article 1). Furthermore, the law establishes 
the forms of commemorating the victory over Nazism and outlines the obligations of public 
bodies and officials in relation to WW2 remembrance in Ukraine. Articles 2, 3 and 4 
 
 
35 
 
outline the obligations of maintaining and erecting war monuments, the use of honor 
guards, facilitating ‘objective and comprehensive’ history research, and identification and 
maintenance of burial places. Finally, the law makes an effort to erase the notion of the 
‘Great Patriotic War’ from official vocabulary. The concluding provision declares null and 
void a previous law that perpetuated the ‘Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945’ and amends 
the Labor Code by substituting the notion from the legislation (Article 7).  
          The law condemning the communist and Nazi’s regimes (2015c) banned communist 
and Nazi’s symbols from public spaces and criminalized propaganda of the regimes. As 
Shevel notes, this law has served as the legal basis for administrative action to remove 
Soviet-era monuments from the public space and rename streets, towns and districts in 
Ukraine (Shevel, 2016, p. 261). The law made a great deal of defining, in legal terms, the 
notion of propaganda, delineating the lists of Soviet security bodies, communist regime 
and NSDAP’s symbols (Article 1). The Article 2 of the law is devoted to defining 
propaganda of the regimes as: 
               “public denial … , dissemination of information oriented to the criminal nature of the 
communist and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes, activities of the Soviet state security 
bodies, establishing Soviet rule in the territory of Ukraine or on its individual administrative 
territories, persecution of the fighters for independence of Ukraine in 20th century …” (§ 2, Article 
1, bold typeface added) 
          The law on legal status and honoring ‘the fighters for independence of Ukraine’ 
(2015d) is deemed to be the most controversial due to risks posed to freedom of speech 
and academia6. On the one hand, the law grants an official status of ‘fighters for 
independence’ to ‘the persons who participated in all forms of political, armed and other 
collective and individual struggle for independence of Ukraine in the 20th century as a part 
of governments, organizations, institutions and groups’ (§ 1, Article 1). The law provides 
a list of such authorities and institutions, encompasses organizations of Ukrainian wartime 
nationalists in particular, and provides social guarantees (Article 3), recognition of awards 
and military ranks (Article 4), and state policy in regard of the former members of listed 
institutions (Article 5). On the other hand, final provisions of the law, as previously 
mentioned, caused a backlash from the academics. The law speaks of legal responsibility 
for the persons ‘who publicly show contempt’ in regard of the fighters for independence 
                                                 
6 See ‘Open Letter from scholars and experts on Ukraine regarding the so-called “Anti-Communist Law”’ (2015) 
initiated by Professor David Marples of University of Alberta (Canada) and signed by prominent political scientists, 
historians and other members of North American and European academia.   
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(§ 1, Article 6). It also recognizes ‘the struggle for independence of Ukraine in the 20th 
century’ as a legitimate cause and aspiration of the Ukrainian people and speaks about 
unlawfulness to deny the cause (§ 2, Article 6).  
          The last ‘de-communization’ law regarding access to archives (2015a) regulates the 
access to archival information of ‘repressive agencies of the communist totalitarian regime 
of 1917-1991’ (Article 1). The provisions of the law are concerned with issues of 
guaranteeing various forms of access (Articles 7-8), defining former Soviet agencies and 
which documents may be accessed freely (Article 3), as well as outlining the state’s 
obligations and policy in the area (Article 4). The Law aims to build up an executive 
authority of UINR, through its Sectoral State Archive, as the main administrator of archival 
information (Articles 12-13). 
          The Presidential decrees and official documents (guidelines) of the UINR represent 
the administrative level of elite-mythmaking pertaining to the representation of WW2. The 
number of presidential decrees has substantiated the legal framework of historical 
remembrance by prescribing commemorative policy to public bodies in Ukraine.  
          In this relation, Decrees N169/2015 and N130/2016 addressed the ministries and 
regional state administrations and, in a line with ‘de-communization’ laws, prescribed to 
conduct actions and measures to commemorate WW2 in a scope of their administrative 
authority (Poroshenko, 2015a; 2016a). For instance, Decree N169/2015 spoke about the 
victory of the Ukrainian people over Nazism in the Second World War, commemorated 
war veterans as well as members of the ‘Ukrainian liberation movement’ by celebrating 
May 8 and 9. Furthermore, in the preamble, it provided a dimension of perpetuating 
memory of ‘victims of the war, war crimes, deportations and crimes against humanity’ in 
commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of WW2.  
          Interestingly, Decree N169/2015 canceled President V. Yanukovych’s previous 
Decree N604/2012 (Yanukovych, 2012) that had envisaged celebration the Great Patriotic 
War victory and the Soviet partisans’ movement for instance. The cancelled decree 
established the celebration of an ‘everlasting act of bravery of the people in the Great 
Patriotic War of 1941-1945, honoring memory of the fallen for the freedom of Fatherland’ 
(Yanukovych, 2012, preamble). The cancelled degree did not mention the dimensions of 
war victims, Ukrainian nationalist underground and did not name victorious ‘people’ at all. 
          The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR) is a central body of 
executive power that ‘realizes the state’s policy in revival and preservation of national 
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memory’ being engendered with a number of administrative powers (see chapter 3 of 
Statute of UINR in CMU, 2014). Acting within its discretion and capacity, the UINR issues 
official documents (guidelines) on commemorative policy.  
          Two months after the Euromaidan upheaval, the newly formed UINR issued the first 
Guidelines on WW2 commemoration (2014) and by doing so was the first institution to 
engage in elite-mythmaking of WW2. Guidelines opens with a discussion of the Victory 
Day celebration practice in the world and Russia. The document contrasts the role May 8 
in Europe and May 9 in the post-Soviet space. In the sub-section on Russia, the document 
states that ‘considering the World War 2 as the Great Patriotic War, revival of Soviet 
tradition of Victory Day celebration is used also to rebuild and intensify ideological 
pressure of Russia on post-Soviet space’ (2014, section on Russia). It stresses that Victory 
Day is a ‘tool of Putin’s regime to rehabilitate the Soviet past’ and used to ‘justify the 
biggest crimes of the Soviet state and Josef Stalin himself’ (ibid.). In the concluding 
passage on Russia, the UINR’s guidelines argue bluntly that this ideological pressure 
became a ‘foundation for pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian attitudes’ in the developments in 
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (ibid.). Furthermore, in a section devoted to Ukraine, the 
UINR has repeated that practice to celebrate Victory Day has originated in the Soviet past, 
and stated that the ‘second Sovietization of Victory Day’ attempted by V. Yanukovych’s 
regime has contributed to aggravating cleavages between Ukrainian citizens (2014, section 
on Ukraine). In UINR’s view, this restorational policy went against the ‘consolidation of 
the national views on place and role of Ukrainians in the war during the years of 
independence’ (ibid.). 
          The second chapter of Guidelines outlines the UINR’s agenda and perspective on 
commemorating Victory Day after the regime change. It emphasizes the need to remove 
Russia’s ideological pressure in any new commemorative policy of WW2 by ‘refusing 
Victory Day celebration in the Soviet format’ (ibid., section on UINR’s agenda). 
According to the UINR, the emphasis should be placed on memory about fallen soldiers 
and not ‘military parades as some form of war propaganda’ or ‘Soviet cult of war’ (ibid.). 
The new policy should encompass perspective of war victims, experiences of people under 
Nazi occupation and POWs in particular (ibid.). On the level of particular measures, the 
UINR stresses the need to introduce a commemoration of May 8, establish the wearing of 
the ‘Red Poppies’ in contrast to St George ribbon, and speak of Ukrainians’ contribution 
to the victory over Nazism regardless of wartime sides by commemorating ‘Red Army and 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s soldiers, ethnic Ukrainians in armies of the Allies’ (ibid.). 
 
 
38 
 
          In subsequent years, the UINR has further developed the framework on WW2 
representation and commemoration in a number of new guidelines (2015a; 2016). The 
2015 document explicitly states the introduction of new commemorative paradigm in 
modern Ukraine as its goal. The major implication is to alienate from the ‘Soviet/Russian 
format’, which, as the document states, ‘does not correspond the historical memory of the 
Ukrainian people and all-European traditions, caused ignoring tragic pages of WW2, 
fostered a cult of war in social consciousness’ (Guidelines, 2015a, preamble). Moreover, 
elements of a new narrative about the war are the following: timespan 1939-1945; 
emphasis on a range of conflicts that included Ukrainians, and not on the Soviet-German 
war of 1941-1945; condemnation of the Soviet Union as Germany’s ally in 1939, and war 
crimes committed by the USSR; framing WW2 as a national Ukrainian tragedy and 
humanitarian catastrophe (ibid., section ‘Historical reference’). It is important to add that 
the UINR forges a vocabulary of referencing to WW2 by providing a list of ‘incorrect’ 
terms and expressions in the document. Thus, the ‘Great Patriotic War’, ‘German-fascist 
invaders’ and ‘Great Victory over fascist Germany’ should be substituted for German-
Soviet war, Nazi occupants, and Victory over Nazism in Europe respectively (ibid., section 
‘Vocabulary of WW2’). 
          On the level of practical measures, the UINR ‘recommends’ public bodies of all 
levels to hold art exhibitions and commemorative symphony orchestras concerts instead 
of parades; the adoption of the motto ‘1939-1945. We honor. We prevail!’; institutionalizes 
the red poppy as a legitimate symbol of war (ibid., section ‘Goal and recommendations’). 
In relation to the latter, the UINR also ‘does not recommend using as symbols of the victory 
red flag with a hammer and sickle, the five-pointed red star and “St George ribbon”’ (ibid.). 
          Finally, Guidelines devoted to 2016 commemorations in May (2016) has 
substantiated WW2 remembrance with adding a gender dimension to it. In addition to 
recapitulating already introduced elements and symbols and stating general policy 
direction, Guidelines’ main focus is on women and their wartime experiences. The 
document motivates the action by the need to reframe the ‘Soviet scheme of a heroic 
narrative’, in which the diverse experiences of women were reduced to number of 
ideologically motivated templates (2016, preamble). Thematically, the UINR devoted the 
2016th commemoration to elevating the gender dimension and recommended secondary 
schools to hold events (lesson-requiem, performances, excursions) on topics related to 
women’s wartime experiences, including meetings with women who lived through WW2 
(2016, section ‘Recommended forms’). 
 
 
39 
 
          To sum up this chapter, elite-mythmaking in post-Euromaidan Ukraine encompasses 
an array of legislative and administrative practices to foster preferable representation of 
the past for memory agents. The elite-mythmaking is guided by an explicitly stated 
memory politics agenda to forge and install representation of WW2 instead of a Soviet-
Russian narrative of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ and its symbols. Moreover, elite-
mythmaking includes not only a reframing of the WW2 narrative, but also of Ukraine’s 
Soviet past in general; developing a new vocabulary, symbols (red poppies), and 
commemoration practices related to WW2 remembrance.  
          In order to justify the differentiation between memory politics in the post-Soviet and 
post-Euromaidan Ukraine, I advance the following arguments: 
a) Elite-mythmaking in post-Euromaidan Ukraine has three memory agents acting 
behind it in a comprehensive manner. The President, the UINR and the Parliament 
construct and install preferable representations of the past and enjoy policy-making 
agreement over the issues of remembrance. As it was in case of ‘de-
communization’ laws adoption when the UINR drafted the laws, Parliament 
adopted the drafts without alternation, and President signed the laws, and 
substantiated framework of WW2 remembrance by his own decrees.  In contrast, 
political elites in post-Soviet Ukraine had never enjoyed such policy-making 
agreement in the area of how to represent the past or deal with Ukraine’s ‘divided’ 
collective memory’; 
b) Current elite-mythmaking goes unchallenged. At the same time, official memory 
politics in post-Soviet Ukraine was highly contested and reversed. In this relation, 
examples of the ‘Victory Flag’ law or unsuccessful legislative attempts to grant 
recognition to Ukrainian wartime nationalists illustrate the ‘swinging pendulum’ 
nature of official memory politics between 1991 and 2014, when competing 
memory agents could not impose durable memory politics; 
c) Current elite-mythmaking actually has a comprehensive agenda to foster preferable 
representation of WW2 in Ukraine by using available legislative and administrative 
means. In contrast, post-Soviet political elites pursued discrete memory politics 
measures at best, confined themselves to particular visions of the past (nationalist 
or Soviet), and often ambivalently combined topics and themes related to WW2 
representation (Portnov, 2013; Klymenko, 2015; Kasianov, 2016).  
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          The next two chapters of the Master’s thesis focus on the narrative on WW2 itself, 
which is being communicated and constructed in modern Ukraine. I intended to show that 
the newly forged Ukrainian narrative communicates WW2 by adopting essential features 
of the ECE historical narrative. The following chapter introduces research agenda of this 
thesis. It delineates the main categories for narrative analysis and introduces the empirical 
corpus of texts to analyze. Thereafter, concluding chapter proceeds with the analysis of the 
narrative and discussion of the findings. 
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3. Narrative analysis and sample texts analyzed 
 
          The following chapter introduces the research design for the thesis. In subsequent 
sections, it explores narrative analysis as a research tool, develops a set of categories for 
the analysis, and introduces the corpus of empirical texts pertaining to representation of 
WW2 in modern Ukraine under scrutiny of this thesis. 
 
3.1. Narrative analysis as a research agenda 
          Usually focused on structure, sequence and elements of story-telling, narrative 
analysis approaches thus can assist in exploring complex historical narratives and structure 
discussion about a particular representation of the past across multiple texts. In particular, 
narrative analysis allows the researcher’s discretion in adjusting to a more content-oriented 
or structure-oriented study (Squire et al., 2008, p. 1-2, 12; Riessman, 2005, p. 2).  
          As Riessman argues, narrative analysis encompasses a ‘family of methods for 
interpreting texts that have in common a storied form’ (2008, p. 11). Narrative analysis is 
used in social sciences to evaluate various texts ranging from individual autobiographical 
stories to ‘political narrative’ of governments and nations (ibid., p. 7, 11). The focus of a 
researcher applying narrative analysis, as Riessman notes, is a ‘sequence of action’ and 
interplay between ‘intention and language – how and why incidents are storied, not simply 
the content to which language refers’ (ibid., p. 11). The focus on sequence and structure is 
what makes narrative analysis different from purely content-oriented qualitative 
approaches according to Riessman (ibid., p. 12). 
          This focus also informs thematic and structural approaches to narrative analysis. In 
Riessman’s seminal typology on approaches to narratives, thematic narrative analysis is 
preoccupied with addressing ‘what’ is ‘told’ (Riessman, 2005, p. 2-3). The thematic 
narrative approach focuses on identifying main themes and topics in an analyzed narrative. 
Methodologically speaking, it requires the researcher to inductively extract categories for 
analysis from a variety of texts and sources (ibid., p. 2). As Riessman notes, ‘investigators 
collect many stories and inductively create conceptual groupings from the data’ (ibid., p. 
2). In other words, students of narrative analysis build up their inquiry around key themes 
of analyzed narrative by scrutinizing oral and written texts under analysis. Importantly, the 
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thematic approach is useful for ‘theorising across number of cases’, and ‘finding common 
thematic elements’ when contemplating across a number of oral or written texts for one’s 
research (ibid., p. 3). 
          By contrast, structural narrative analysis focuses on language rather than content, or 
in Riessman’s words, ‘the way a story is told’ (ibid., p. 3). Although some focus on content 
is present when following the structural approach, the main concern is on ‘how a teller by 
selecting particular narrative devices make story persuasive’ (ibid., p. 3). Paying exclusive 
attention to language details and features of texts, structural approach fits ‘detailed case 
studies’ or examination of a few cases (ibid., p. 4). However, following the premises of 
structural approach without focus on content may imply danger to ‘decontextualise 
narratives by ignoring historical, interactional and institutional factors’ (ibid., p. 4).  
          Besides focusing on structural and thematic elements, narrative analysis is helpful 
in revealing identity categories (see e.g. Lawler, 2002, p. 242, 249-250, 255). In this 
relation, De Fina points out that considering narratives as ‘the prime vehicle for expressing 
identity’ is commonplace in social science scholarship (De Fina, 2015, p. 351). 
Specifically, De Fina distinguishes a ‘interactionally oriented approach’ to narratives that 
assists in digesting identities and delineating identity categories in a narrative. The 
‘interactional’ perspective focuses on the ‘process of identity construction itself – the 
strategies used by narrators, co-narrators, and their audience to achieve, contest, or reaffirm 
specific identities’ (ibid., p. 352). It holds that narrators anchor or ‘position’ themselves 
within a narrative by ‘creating protagonists and antagonists, expressing evaluations of such 
characters’ actions’ (ibid., p. 360). By engaging in story-telling (narrative construction), 
members of, for instance, a group or a community ‘reproduce or recirculate generally 
shared representations about self and others’ (ibid., p. 363). 
 
3.2. Eastern Central European (ECE) historical narrative template 
          As it argued in the previous chapter, the Eastern Central European (ECE) historical 
narrative on WW2 is exemplified with exclusive focus on Soviet totalitarian regime’s 
crimes and critical understanding of the Soviet Union’s role in the war (Mälksoo, 2009; 
Neumayer, 2015; Siddi, 2016). Therefore, it can be argued, that the ECE narrative 
considers the Soviet Union an equal criminal protagonist of the war and of inflicted 
national suffering when representing the past. Consequently, alleviating national suffering 
and downplaying the Holocaust and other context-specific ‘dark pasts’ follow up the 
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exclusive focus on the Soviet Union’s role in the ECE historical narrative on WW2 (see 
e.g. Siddi, 2016). Essentially, the ECE narrative template captures:  
          a) negative attitude towards the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as main national 
antagonists in the war;  
          b) centrality of national suffering elaborated in a set of martyrological events with 
regard to outbreak, development, and the unjust end of the war (‘Yalta betrayal’ in 
Mälksoo, 2009). For instance, in the Polish and the Baltics’ context, central events of 
respective narratives would be the Katyn massacres (see Etkind et al., 2012; Fredericks, 
2011) and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (see Berg and Ehin, 2009; Eglitis and Ardava, 
2012; on ‘narrative of rupture’ in Estonian context in Joesalu, 2012); 
          c) downplay, omit, relativize the Holocaust and local ‘dark pasts’ in national 
narratives. 
          I follow both thematic and structural approaches to narrative analysis for the purpose 
of this thesis. My focus is on protagonists/antagonists in the narrative, key events, 
narrative’s character, narrative’s plot and its key terms as a product of elite-mythmaking 
of political memory of WW2 in modern Ukraine. These categories were extracted and 
designed based on reading the texts on WW2 representation on the one hand, and working 
through narrative construction literature on the other. Importantly, the categories are 
intended to capture elements of the Eastern Central European (ECE) historical narrative. 
More specifically, I transcended the elements into my own categories for the analysis. The 
following table summarizes the point and the following sections explore each category in 
more detail. 
Table 1. ECE narrative and narrative analysis categories 
ECE historical narrative template Narrative analysis categories 
Negative attitude towards the Soviet 
Union and the Nazi Germany 
Antagonist and Protagonist 
Centrality of national suffering, 
martyrological events 
Key events (Ukrainian nationalist 
underground), narrative’s character, 
narrative’s plot 
The Holocaust and national ‘dark 
pasts’ 
Key events (the Holocaust, 
Ukrainian-Polish conflict), 
narrative’s character 
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3.3. Analysis categories: Antagonist and Protagonist 
           In order to evaluate the antagonistic nature of the Soviet Union, this thesis focuses 
on its role in the outbreak, developments, the end of the war and overall image as provided 
by Ukraine’s narrative on WW2. Research questions for this category are the following: 
What are the roles of Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in the war according to new 
Ukraine’s narrative? Does the narrative frame its role as comparable and equally criminal 
to Nazi Germany’s role? More generally, how are the Soviet regime and Ukraine’s past in 
the Soviet Union defined and represented by memory agents? 
           Furthermore, turning to protagonists, the thesis focuses on representation of 
Ukrainians in the narrative. What is being said about Ukrainians in the war as protagonists? 
What is their role in the narrative? Who is included and excluded from representation of 
the war as its protagonists? What is being communicated about the protagonists with regard 
to outbreak, developments and the war’s end? What is being communicated and what are 
the relations between the antagonists and the protagonists in the narrative? 
 
3.4. Analysis categories: Key events 
          Thematic narrative analysis is useful for digesting complex historical narratives 
around key topics in an analyzed narrative. By focusing on elements of the narratives, it 
helps to define key topics or key events in representation of the past. For instance, Abdou 
(2017) uses the premises of thematic narrative approach for digesting ‘key themes’, 
assessing ‘key actors’ and ‘key actors roles’ in the Egyptian national narrative provided in 
official history textbooks. In his framework (2017, p. 84), those categories encapsulate the 
‘traits and characteristics of the key protagonists’ and ‘the actions attributed’ to them in 
the narrative of Egyptian textbooks (ibid.).  
          This thesis focuses on key events of Ukraine’s narrative of WW2 as well. In this 
relation, Wylegala’s (2017) conceptualization of the main events in Ukrainian collective 
memory is particularly useful for the thesis. In her recent study, Wylegala (2017) 
differentiates three crucial issues of Ukrainian past in relation to the war: WW2 and the 
OUN-UPA, the Shoah7, and the Polish-Ukrainian conflict8 (ibid., p. 2). On the one hand, 
                                                 
7 See more on the issue of Ukrainian nationalists’ participation in the Holocaust in Himka, 2012; Rudling, 2011 
8 Polish-Ukrainian conflict refers to Volyn massacres of 1943, which was an ethnic purge of Poles perpetrated by the 
Ukrainian nationalist underground on territories of Volyn and Eastern Halychyna (modern Western Ukraine). For more 
see in Rudling, 2012; Snyder, 2003 
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the inclusion of the Ukrainian nationalist underground is justified by contestation over the 
issue of its role in WW2. In particular, representation of the OUN and UPA in modern 
Ukraine, as Wylegala argues, is ‘crucial for determining national identity and one’s place 
in the larger historical process’ (ibid., p. 2). On the other hand, the Holocaust and Volyn 
massacres of 1943 exemplify ‘uncomfortable matters which endanger the positive image 
of the entire national community, and which most Ukrainians would either prefer to forget 
or have already forgotten’ (ibid., p. 2). It may be said that if the first key event pertains to 
efforts to establish a heroic past in Ukraine’s narrative on WW2, the two latter speak of 
the ‘dark pasts’ in Ukrainian collective memory.  
          Therefore, following Wylegala and in order to differentiate key elements of 
Ukraine’s narrative on WW2, this thesis focuses on what is being said about the Ukrainian 
nationalist underground, the Holocaust and Volyn massacres of 1943 as the key events of 
modern Ukraine’s narrative about the war. The main question here is what does the 
narrative communicate about the key events?  
 
3.5. Analysis categories: Character of the narrative 
          Elite-mythmaking produces certain kind of narratives usually referred to as self-
glorifying, self-whitewashing and other-maligning myths (He, 2007, p. 45; He, 2009, p. 
25). This reflects the instrumental nature of mythmaking argued by Yinan He: ‘ruling elites 
tend to create national myths for instrumental purposes and infuse these myths into national 
collective memory through institutional tools’ (2009, p. 25). Such narratives usually 
‘glorify their own countries’ beneficence and virtues, deny guilt for crimes and blame 
others for tragedies’ (He, 2007, p. 45). Moreover, Pääbo elaborates further on each type of 
elite-produced narratives. In his framework, self-glorification refers to a nation’s ‘positive 
self-image’, and cultivating ‘national pride … virtue and wisdom’ (Pääbo, 2011, p. 60). 
Importantly, self-glorifying narratives combine heroism and victimhood when narrating 
the past as a means for elevating national pride (ibid.). Self-whitewashing narratives 
downplay particular events (‘national wrongdoings’, ‘dark pasts’) when representing the 
past by using omissions or justifying the event (ibid., p. 60-61). Finally, other-maligning 
narratives frame ‘the image of the Other’ as having a ‘negative character’, and by doing so 
‘improve its own nation’s image’ (ibid., p. 61). Also, other-maligning myths mark the case 
of shifting responsibility on to others for the wrongdoing in particular (ibid., p. 81).  
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          At the same time, as it argued in the second chapter, European discourse on WW2 
introduces a critical, or ‘coming to terms with the past’, understanding of wartime events. 
In particular, Lebow (2006, p. 21, 35) points out ‘wrenching’ debates on wartime 
wrongdoings as legitimate part of WW2 discourse. So, acknowledging the responsibility 
for ‘dark pasts’ marks the case of Europeanizing historical discourse in a particular society.  
          Therefore, in order to assess the narrative’s character, this thesis focuses on how the 
key events are described in Ukraine’s narrative on WW2 in terms of glorification, 
whitewashing, shifting responsibility, or critical acknowledgment of wrongdoing.  
 
3.6. Analysis categories: Plot 
          The category of plot evaluates three previous categories taken together: 
protagonists/antagonists, key events and narrative’s character. Under this category, I seek 
to evaluate what are the relations or ‘pattern’ between the three previous categories: What 
could be the abstract template encompassing interplay between protagonists and 
antagonists, key events and narrative’s character? Does the narrative communicates 
‘trauma’ in terms of Aleida Assman (2004, p. 28) or does it proposes heroic template of 
Ukrainians participating in WW2? More specifically, does the narrative propose a story of 
resistance and liberation or does it speak about subjugation, inflicted suffering and trauma? 
      
         The corpus of sample texts analyzed in this thesis consist of 39 texts and 19 video-
clips. As already argued, elite-mythmaking in post-Euromaidan Ukraine is a process of 
installing preferable representation of WW2 by three memory agents: the President, the 
Remembrance institute (UINR), and the Parliament (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine - VRU). 
For this reason, I have focused on the narrative produced by these three agents of 
mythmaking. The texts include: 19 presidential speeches and addresses; 13 verbatim 
reports of the Parliament of Ukraine (VRU), one VRU’s statement, and four statements of 
parliamentary factions or heads of parliamentary factions; 2 books issued by the Ukrainian 
Institute of National Remembrance and 19 video-clips made under the UINR’s auspices 
(e.g. by the request of the Institute and the Government of Ukraine). 
          The presidential speeches and addresses were collected from the official presidential 
website. Collecting the speeches was made in two rounds. In the first round, I browsed for 
speeches delivered by the President on occasions directly related to WW2 commemoration 
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(May 8 and 9, Remembrance Day of Crimean Tatars deportation). In the second round, the 
search was broadened to speeches that could have included references to WW2. The 
second round revealed that on a number of additional occasions the President brought up 
the topic of WW2 experiences in his addresses (Independence Day, addresses to military 
chaplains and military lyceum’s graduates – see Bibliography). The time frame of collected 
speeches pertain to 2014-2017.  
          Further, this thesis includes verbatim reports of Ukraine’s parliament as a third 
memory agent of elite-mythmaking. The verbatim reports and VRU’s statement were 
collected through Parliament’s official website (rada.gov.ua). Parliamentary factions’ 
statements and statements of factions’ leaders when those actors spoke about historical 
issues (four documents altogether) were also included. Here, gathering verbatim reports 
followed the same logic as when collecting Presidential speeches by browsing for plenary 
sessions devoted to WW2 remembrance in 2014-2017. 
          Finally, in its pursuit to forge a new narrative on WW2, the UINR has issued two 
books, which are included in this analysis. “Ukraine in WW2” (UINR, 2015b) was 
intended as a reference book and has a collective authorship by the Remembrance Institute. 
The second book, “The War and the Myth” (Viatrovych et al., 2016), has been published 
under the auspices of UINR and holds its official credential. The authors of 50 separate 
entries for the book are both co-workers (public servants) of the Institute, including its 
head and deputy head, and several academic historians affiliated to the Institute or brought 
in for the publication. Furthermore, 19 video-clips on WW2 remembrance presented by 
the Remembrance Institute in 2015-2016 and disseminating the new narrative were also 
included into the analysis. Importantly, these are not visual characteristics of the clips, but 
the narration they disseminate, that is under scrutiny in this thesis. In other words, the clips 
are treated as texts for narrative analysis. 
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4. Narrative analysis 
          The following chapter proceeds with the analysis of historical narrative of WW2 and 
its elements that are forged as part of elite-mythmaking in modern Ukraine. Based on the 
analysis of narrative data in this thesis, I argue that the narrative establishes the Ukrainians 
as a nation as a main actor (protagonist) of WW2. The focus of the narrative is on 
Ukrainians’ statelessness, which is defining characteristic of Ukrainian wartime 
experience. The ultimate cause of achieving the independence and state-building effort is 
implied and meant to be a teleological goal of the protagonist in the narrative. The Soviet 
Union is condemned as comparable and equally criminal to Nazi Germany due to its role 
in the outbreak and the wrongdoings committed during WW2. Moreover, new 
representation of WW2 is inextricably linked with defining Ukraine’s Soviet past in 
general. The major finding here is that the narrative includes discussion about pre-Soviet 
Union Ukrainian governments, representation of national liberation efforts during the war 
into representation of WW2, and antagonizes the Soviet state-building in Ukraine as alien. 
Importantly, the emphasis in describing wartime experiences is always placed on the 
Ukrainians, and not on the states and governments. In other words, according to the 
narrative, Ukrainians as a nation have contributed to the Allies victory over Nazism 
whereas being a part of the Soviet Union/Ukrainian SSR is downplayed. 
           Each section of this chapter is structured according to the narrative analysis 
categories introduced in the previous chapter: antagonist and protagonist; key events and 
narrative’s character; narrative’s plot. The narrative is dismantled into these elements, 
and the findings are grouped and discussed around each element (section). Importantly, 
the concluding section wraps up the whole thesis pertaining both to elite-mythmaking and 
narrative construction of WW2 in modern Ukraine. It discusses the findings, evaluates the 
Ukrainian narrative in the light of European discourses about WW2, contemplates about 
mythmaking, on the one hand, and conflict dynamics in Ukraine on the other. 
 
4.1. Antagonist and Protagonist 
        In relation to the protagonist and antagonist in the analyzed narrative, there are six 
themes commonly brought by the President, the Parliament and the UINR: 
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a) Stateless Ukrainians are seen to be a protagonist and contributor to the victory over 
Nazism; 
b) Ascribing teleological (directional) dimension to representation of WW2: historical 
experiences of WW2 are contextualized into an overarching story of Ukrainian 
struggle for national independence; 
c) Contrasting genuine Ukrainian historical experience with the interpretation of the 
WW2 imposed by the ‘Soviet empire’ and associated with it relicts (e.g. contrasting 
old militarist Victory Day with the newly installed Reconciliation and Remembrance 
Day, and Day of Defender of Ukraine associated with UPA); 
d) Condemning the Soviet Union for its crimes in WW2; 
e) Equating historical experience of Ukrainians in WW2 with contemporary warfare in 
Eastern Ukraine; 
f) Equating the soldiers of the Red Army and Ukrainian nationalist underground 
movement and claiming legitimacy of Ukrainian nationalist underground in the 
struggle over Nazism 
          According to analyzed narrative data, every memory agent brings the themes in 
different configurations: addressing the majority of the themes at once (the president) or 
preferring to address one theme or some themes predominantly (the parliament, the UINR). 
This reflects the status of the memory agent in elite-mythmaking. On the one hand, the 
president’s commemorative speeches usually address all themes, always legitimize 
Ukrainians in different armies, and relate historical wartime experiences to the 
contemporary agenda. This reflects both the symbolic role of the president as the head of 
state addressing the nation and as a foreign policy decision-maker. On the other, the UINR 
addresses issues related to defining the Soviet past and the Soviet Union’s role in WW2 
based on its status as a governmental institution using its expertise to engage with the issues 
in detail. At the same time, in parliamentary discussions, MPs engaged in elevating 
Ukrainian nationalist underground more, which reflects Parliament’s role as a stakeholder 
over the issue of legal recognition and MPs partisan involvement over the issue. 
          As to consistency between the agents, the president’s and the UINR’s stances usually 
coincide. In fact, the presidential May 8 and 9 speeches reproduced whole passages from 
the UINR official guidelines. In the parliament, some MPs opposed new WW2 
remembrance on several occasions (Shufrych, Vilkul in VRU, 2016c). However, this 
should not suggest that the ‘Great Patriotic War’ discourse has vanished, but rather that its 
vocal supporters, former Party of Regions members, have chosen to avoid confrontation 
with the majority of MPs, who support the new framework. For the same reason, 
apparently, no one spoke out against them when ‘de-communization’ laws were discussed.  
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4.1.1. The President 
        The pattern of protagonizing the Ukrainians and antagonizing the Soviet Union can 
be identified in Presidential speeches and addresses. The presidential strategy is to 
disengage the genuine Ukrainian perspective on WW2 from the Soviet past by claiming 
statelessness, condemn crimes of the Soviet Union, and legitimize the experiences of the 
Ukrainians regardless of wartime sides in the nation’s victory over Nazism. 
         Foremost, in president’s view, the defining characteristic of Ukrainians in WW2 is 
their statelessness. This creates a paradoxical situation where the Ukrainians are seen as a 
‘victorious nation’ contributing to transnational victory over Nazism, and granting liberty 
to other European nations, yet, being unfree themselves. The role of the Soviet government 
is usually downplayed by the president. As the president said during 2015 
commemorations in May: 
               “Ukraine, even though not as an independent state, but due to its immense contribution 
to victory over Nazism – became a member of Anti-Hitler’s coalition. The Ukrainian people 
rightfully joined the victorious nations and the founders of the United Nations” (Poroshenko, 
2015c) 
          As the passage shows, the president considers and equates Ukrainians’ contribution 
as a nation to the Allies’ victory over Nazism. Interestingly, he states that this was the 
‘Ukrainian people’ (ukrainskiy narod), who joined the United Nations, and not the 
government of the Ukrainian SSR. This was ‘invaluable Ukrainians’ contribution in 
common victory of European nations over Nazism’, which is usually emphasized by the 
president (2015h). The president understands the protagonist as a Ukrainian national 
community. In order to downplay being a part of the USSR and continue the legal line of 
mythmaking, in which the Soviet state-building in Ukraine is argued to be illegitimate, this 
rhetorical strategy protagonizes the stateless nation versus the Soviet Union and Nazi 
Germany. As a rule, the notion of statelessness immediately follows stating the 
contribution of Ukrainians. As the president said when addressing the Parliament:  
               “Ukraine, which was not an independent state, however became the member of Anti-
Hitler’s coalition de facto, and we, Ukrainians, became a glorious nation. However, the end of 
WW2 did not give Ukraine liberty” (Poroshenko, 2015d)  
           Moreover, condemning the Soviet Union provides a moral ground for alienating the 
Soviet past: when this past is disentangled and there is no attachment to it, than it is possible 
to juxtapose genuine Ukrainian experiences to the false Soviet framework of WW2. 
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According to the president, these are ‘Kremlin leaders’, ‘communist regime’, ‘henchmen 
of the Soviet regime’ (2015g; 2016i) being condemn for mass repressions during WW2. 
Consequently, ‘crimes of communism’, ‘victims of communist regime’ justify 
disregarding both ‘Soviet-Russian imperial’ understanding of WW2 and eradicating the 
Soviet past from the public spaces. The Soviet Union, or ‘country of communist regime, 
in which paranoid intention to subjugate all nations of the Soviet empire, keep them in fear 
and obedience, was realized’ (2015g) is blamed as a ‘source’ of not only repressions, but 
as negative actor fueling WW2 (2015d). Therefore, ‘millions of Ukrainians exterminated 
by Bolshevism’ oblige contemporaries to eradicate ‘Soviet ideological junk’ from the 
public spaces (2016i). Administrative action to remove the symbols is ‘an issue of national 
security’, and the president ‘will not allow Novorossyian toponyms to slander Ukraine’ 
(2016i). 
         Finally, disentangling the Soviet past leads to discovering ‘new horizons of historical 
cognition’ (2015d), which includes the previously suppressed memory about nationalist 
underground (2015c; 2016d, g, j), shifting to 1939 and including Ukrainians in Allied 
Armies in WW2 remembrance (2015c, d; 2016g). 
           However, occasionally, the president undermines his reasoning himself. For 
instance, there is a tension to frame statelessness and being victorious at the same time. 
This tension is well exemplified with president’s attitude towards the Red Army’s role in 
WW2. On the one hand, in landmark commemorative speeches on May 8 and May 9, the 
president prefers to speak about contribution of the Ukrainians overall. On the other hand, 
in smaller address regarding liberation of Ukraine’s territory, the president continues to 
speak about the Red Army’s contribution: 
               “Victorious 22-months long battle for Ukraine became decisive reason of Nazi Germany 
and its allies defeat. The military pathways of proudly named the ‘Ukrainian fronts’ covered 
territory from Dnipro to Elba, from Kyiv to Vienna, to Prague and Berlin. Of course, not only 
Ukrainians took part in combat on that fronts. And, of course, Ukrainians took part on the other 
fronts of WW2. These were them [meaning Ukrainians in the Red Army] who participated in 
expulsion of Nazis from Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugolsavia, Austria and Czechoslovakia, and 
stormed the Reichstag.” (Poroshenko, 2016i) 
          On another occasion, the president inadvertently legitimizes Ukraine’s Soviet past 
by implying that the Soviet Union was not an antagonist in WW2. When addressing 
modern Ukraine’s hardships and condemning Russia’s aggression, the president states:  
                 “Nowadays in the East of Europe, the unprecedented violation of international law since 
Hitler and Stalin is taking place. Insidious and greedy empire again does not count with states 
borders and tries to expand its living space. Ukraine again is resisting but only with one difference- 
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the enemy came not from the West, but from the East” (Poroshenko, 2016g; bold typeface added; 
similar passage in 2015d) 
          Altogether this suggests additional complications for the president as a memory 
agent to address being both a victorious nation and, yet, not having freedom on its own, 
and to keep to the notion of stateless protagonist and ‘de-Sovietize’ (Yurchuk, 2017) any 
reference to Ukrainians in WW2 consistently. As Yurchuk notes, ‘it proves difficult to 
eradicate the past that one was once a part of’ with memory agents continuing to ‘work 
within the old Soviet tradition from which they strive to distance themselves’ (2017, p. 
105). In this thesis, however, it is rather the president, who exemplifies the tension. 
Whereas the UINR and MPs confine themselves easily to ‘de-Sovietizing’ rhetoric. This 
may suggest that the president keeps to a symbolic obligation to accommodate different 
wartime experiences when addressing the nation, while other memory agents hold more 
partisan-inclined views on the past.  
 
                 4.1.2. The Parliament 
          Analyzed parliamentary sessions concentrated predominantly on relating wartime 
experiences to the contemporary agenda, and elevating the Ukrainian nationalist 
underground. On the one hand, since early 2014, the topics related to WW2 appeared in 
parliamentary discussions following the development of Russian aggression. For instance, 
some nationalist MPs compared and equated Russian aggression to Nazi Germany actions 
(Tiagnybok, Liashko in VRU, 2014b). Also, Crimean Tatars deportation in 1944 appeared 
in the discussions (Poroshenko, Herashchenko in VRU, 2014, Teteruk, Hopko in VRU, 
2015c; Chubarov, 2015d; Liashko, Chubarov in VRU, 2015e; Dzhemilev, 2015; Hopko, 
Parubiy, Illienko in VRU, 2016c; Parubiy in VRU, 2016d).  
          Nevertheless, the major finding with regard to analyzed parliamentary sessions is 
that MPs establish continuity between wartime Ukrainians in the nationalist underground 
and Ukrainians nowadays. In this logic, the nationalist underground exemplifies the 
liberation struggle of the 20th century, and its experiences is seen to be continued in modern 
day Ukraine and invoked when speaking about contemporary events. As Yuriy Lutsenko 
stated:  
               “I recall coming to Lviv’s maidan and saying that this is only because we have 
Halychyna region, whole Ukraine can obtain liberty in the Revolution of Dignity; only 
because troops of UPA have sacrificed themselves, we have Euromaidan Self-Defense and 
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volunteer battalions in the East nowadays, and this country has a chance” (Lutsenko in 
VRU, 2015a) 
           The other people’s deputy argued about ‘spiritual line of Ukrainianess’ between the 
UPA and modern patriotic mobilization (Yavorivskiy, in VRU, 2014c). Similarly, the line 
of inheritance or ‘historical continuum’ between historical and present-day freedom 
fighters was stated numerously (Tiagnybok, Kyrylenko, Doniy in VRU, 2014c; Beresiuk, 
Mosiychuk, Lutsenko in VRU, 2015a) 
          The national liberation is struggle exemplified by the underground during WW2 
motivates restoring ‘historical justice’ and granting legal recognition to wartime 
nationalists (Parubiy, Medunycia, Mosiychuk, Liashko in VRU, 2015a; Liashko in 2015d). 
As the Speaker of Parliament said during the session extensively devoted to OUN-UPA, 
and which has ended with the ‘de-communization’ laws adoption: 
                “our struggle is one hundred years long war […]. One hundred years we are waging 
war against Russian imperialism and Russian occupation. This is the time to honor those people, 
who under the national flag and Trident fought for the Ukrainian state, from behalf of [modern] 
Ukrainian state.” (Parubiy in VRU, 2015a) 
          It is important to add that the notion of obligation to commemorate the nationalist 
underground (Liahsko, Stoyko, Turchynov in VRU, 2014c; Viatrovych, Shuhevych, 
Krul’ko, Holovko in VRU, 2015a; Medunycia in VRU, 2015c; Kniazytskiy in VRU, 
2016c) is usually accompanied with the refrain that if there was no nationalists’ liberation 
struggle during WW2, Ukraine would not have emerged as an independent state decades 
after. This suggests teleological sequencing of narrative on WW2, in which the goal of 
achieving national independence is implied in relation to the past and proscribed to 
proceeding events.  
 
4.1.3. The UINR 
          The UINR is the memory agent that provides the myth-making endeavor with 
appearance of professional expertise. Similarly to the president, the UINR disentangles the 
Ukrainian perspective on WW2 by arguing statelessness and alienating the Soviet past. 
The UINR’s publications focus on two things: condemnation of the Soviet Union role in 
WW2, drawing negative image of the Soviet Union with regard to its outbreak and 
development, and focusing on stateless Ukrainians as the main protagonist. Table 2 
summarizes what is being communicated about protagonist and antagonist with the 
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disseminated narrative in greater detail with bibliographical references (see the Table 2 in 
Annex 1). 
          Foremost, the analyzed UINRs publications focus on rebuking the framework of the 
‘Great Patriotic War’ remembrance as a ‘Soviet hisotriographic and ideological 
construction’, which helps to shift the beginning of the war to 1939 (Prymachenko, 2016a, 
p. 14). In this logic, the concept itself and the Soviet interpretation of WW2 at large were 
imposed unto Ukrainians and, as Prymachenko notes, the interpretation ‘does not 
correspond to the experience of the Ukrainian people during WW2’ (Prymachenko, 2016a, 
p. 14). In contrast, the Ukrainian experience of WW2 is related to ethnic Ukrainians’ 
experiences already in 1939 as a part of different states and regimes. Thus, it is stated that 
Ukrainians in Zakarpattia region, who resisted annexation of the region by the Hungarian 
army in early 1939, and Ukrainians in the Polish Army in September of 1939, were the 
first to experience the unfolding of WW2 (UINR, 2015b, p. 4, 6, 8-9; also Horobets, 
2016a). 
          Secondly, this reasoning to refute Soviet interpretation of WW2 assists in 
antagonizing the Soviet period of Ukraine’s past. On one occasion, it is made by equating 
‘Soviet’ and ‘Bolshevik’ for instance. Also, the negative attitude towards the Soviet state 
building as alien is prescribed to all Ukrainians. As Prymachenko argues: 
               “Only eight years had passed after the Holodomor9, and three after the Great Terror. 
For preceding WW2 decades, the communist regime exterminated at least five million people in 
Ukraine. Many considered the beginning of the Soviet-German war as opportunity to be free from 
Bolshevism” (Prymachenko, 2016a, p. 16) 
          Another UINR’s publication relies on pre-Soviet national building efforts in Ukraine 
in order to antagonize the Soviet past. In the context of discussing Ukrainians’ dividedness 
in the late 1930s between the USSR and other Eastern European states, the UINR makes 
reference to Kyiv’s provisional government of the Ukrainian Peoples Republic of 1917 
(UNR), to show imposed character of statelessness before WW2: 
               “The Ukrainian revolution began earlier than in other countries of the region: in 
Lithuania, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia and the Balkans. 
                 In December 1917, after the Kharkiv puppet government was formed and the Bolsheviks 
proclaimed a “Soviet Ukraine”, the Russian Bolsheviks unleashed war against Ukraine. 
                The fight against the Bolsheviks continued until 1921. This war and other conflicts 
exhausted Ukraine and it lost its independence” (UINR, 2015b, p. 8; see also Zinchenko et al., 
2016) 
                                                 
9 The Holodomor refers to man-made famine of 1932-1933 in the Soviet Ukraine 
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          Importantly, this imposed statelessness is a major characteristic, which defines 
Ukrainian wartime experience. As Horobets states in the other UINR’s publication: 
               “The absence of its own state was a tragedy of the Ukrainian people, and, consequently, 
of its dividedness between warring parties of the conflict. In the beginning of German aggression 
against the USSR, Ukrainians were in the whirlpool of the great war for more than two years 
already.” (Horobets, 2016a, p. 29) 
          Furthermore, the UINR’s publications draw negative image of the Soviet Union, 
especially with regard to the outbreak and initial developments of WW2. Drawing a 
negative image is exemplified with condemning the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and 
cooperation between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in 1939-1941 (Maiorov, 2016a, 
b; Horobets, 2016b; Galushko, 2016a; Pavlov, 2016a). In the Ukrainian context, it also 
means claiming that ‘the Soviets’ were not ‘liberators’ of Western Ukraine in September 
of 1939 (UINR, 2015b, p. 11; Zinchenko et al., 2016; Zinchneko, 2016b). Some authors 
make an effort to establish transnational remembrance of WW2 by including the Katyn 
massacres of Polish officers in the Ukrainian narrative of WW2 (UINR, 2015b, p. 10; 
Zinchenko, 2016a, c). 
          Also, the UINR’s publications refutes the Soviet propaganda myths related to WW2 
developments in Ukraine. This includes revealing military losses and defeats of 1941 to 
undermine the unquestionable Soviet heroic interpretation of WW2 (Riabenko, 2016b), 
disregarding ‘Panfilov’s 28 Guardsmen’ as fabricated by Soviet military journalists case 
(Pavlov, 2016b), blaming Crimean Tatars for mass collaboration and justifying their 
repression in 1944 (Gromenko, 2016c, d, e), ‘silencing’ unpleasant past and developing 
false historiographical framework of WW2 (Riabenko, 2016f; Yaremenko, 2016). 
           This constant motive to condemn the Soviet Union leads to a paradoxical situation 
when discussion of the Soviet wartime crimes goes without a critical engagement with the 
fact that Ukrainians constituted a considerable part of the Red Army or the Soviet partisan 
movement (Riabenko, 2016e; Butko and Riabenko, 2016). In this relation, Riabenko 
devoted his entry to Red Army’s crimes against civilians on the territory of defeated 
Germany. By citing the Red Army soldiers’ letters as well as referring to preventive 
measures taken by the Soviet military command to uphold discipline, the entry speculates 
over the issues of looting and mass rape and argues that ‘the crimes were nor rare. For 
committing the criminal offenses many Red Army soldiers were sentenced by military 
tribunals’ (Riabenko, 2016 e, p. 215).  
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          One passage is revealing in a sense of trying to legitimize its point by relying on 
‘official Russian historiography’ but, in the same time, avoids expanding on what could be 
the Ukrainian perspective on the issue: 
               “The facts [events] of crimes against civilians were mass and are undeniable to such 
extent that even the official Russian historiography recognizes them. According to O. 
Rzeshevskiy, the president of the Association of historians of WW2, tribunals sentenced for offenses 
4, 148 officers and great number of ordinary soldiers for the first few months of 1945 only” 
(Riabenko, 2016e, p. 217; bold typeface added) 
          The UINR tries to distance Ukrainians from the Soviet Union by arguing the 
Ukrainians’ statelessness in general. One UINR’s publication appropriates concepts 
existing in the Western scholarship to its own ends. As the UINR’s argues without referring 
to Timothy Snyder’s work directly: 
               “The victims of this clash of two totalitarianisms were both the military and civilian 
Ukrainians, the area between the Carpathians and the Don River became known as the 
‘Bloodlands’. That was the price Ukrainians paid for a lack of their own independent state” 
(UINR, 2015b, p. 4) 
          Continuing this reasoning, Horobets stated that the Soviet troops ‘did not liberated 
[Ukraine] from the occupants, but only expelled them. The expulsion of the occupants did 
not bring freedom to Ukraine, but only different totalitarian regime’ (Horobets, 2016d). In 
other words, the end of the war brings the issue of Ukrainian statelessness back again 
(UINR, 2015b, p. 22-23) 
          The same pattern of protagonizing the Ukrainians exemplified with disseminated by 
UINR video-materials. Generally, the materials substantiate a general framework of 
remembrance already specified in UINR’s program documents as well as commemorate 
individual acts of military vigor in new pantheon of wartime heroes. The latter group is 
devoted to UPA’s underground fighters, Ukrainians in the Soviet military and intelligence, 
and Ukrainians in the Armies of Allies (see UINR and the Government, 2015d, e, f, g, h). 
          On the one hand, the visual materials use biographical stories of Ukrainians in the 
Allies’ armed forces to move from speaking about Soviet Ukrainians only in the new 
representation of the past. By referencing to individual biographies, the narrative 
establishes Ukrainian contributions to the victory over Nazism as part of transnational 
remembrance of WW2. One video-material (UCMC and UINR, 2015) speaks of profound 
losses of the war and its catastrophic impact and withdraws from praising the victory in 
WW2 at all. 
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          On the other hand, they provide a framework for remembering wartime heroes 
regardless of wartime sides in a somewhat reconciliatory manner. In this logic, Soviet 
military men and women (UINR and the Government, 2015d, g; UINR and “UA: Ukraine”, 
2016a) and nationalist underground fighters (UINR and the Government, 2015f; UINR and 
“UA: Ukraine”, 2016c) equally worth commemoration. Moreover, when it comes to 
defining the sides to which Ukrainians were part of, several video-clips frame Ukrainians 
as taking part in international endeavor to combat Nazism (UINR and the Government, 
2015a, b) and ending up as one of the United Nations founders (ibid., 2015c). In other 
words, the precise armies and sides matter and being mentioned when discussing discrete 
biographies, but overall endeavor is attributed to the national community of Ukrainians as 
a whole during WW2. 
          The other remarkable finding concerns the relation between WW2 and the War in 
Donbas in analyzed narrative. In this regard, three of the analyzed video-materials 
accompany narration of private letters to the fronts of WW2 with the footage of the fighting 
in Eastern Ukraine in 2014-2016. The three materials cite unnamed mother-to-son or son-
to-father letters (UINR, 2015a, b, c) in a manner that invokes direct analogy with the 
contemporary war. The remaining video-material features 97-years old war veteran 
speaking about losing his grandson, the National Guard soldier, in the Donbas war (UINR, 
2015d). By doing so, disseminated video-materials establish the link, in one occasion 
autobiographical one, between different wartime experiences, and equate the experiences 
across the times. 
 
4.2. Key events: Ukrainian nationalist underground, the Holocaust and Volyn massacres 
of 1943 
 
4.2.1  The Ukrainian nationalists  
          The new narrative of WW2 draws a preferable image of Ukrainian nationalist 
underground (OUN and UPA). The memory agents of elite-mythmaking include and 
justify the Ukrainian nationalists into new representation of WW2. 
           The president’s framing of the nationalist underground has a three-fold structure. 
Usually, the president refers to wartime nationalists as example of military vigor for the 
contemporaries to follow (Poroshenko, 2015b; 2016d, j). Moreover, the mentioning of 
members of OUN-UPA goes along with mentioning of the military and political 
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organizations from pre-WW2 and pre-Soviet past (1917-1922) (ibid.). This again suggests 
that the narrative of WW2 is also a narrative about the whole Soviet past.  
          Moreover, in presidential speeches and addresses, it is common to equate Red Army 
soldiers and veterans with the fighters of nationalist underground (Poroshenko, 2015c, d, 
h; 2016i, g). In this logic, Red Army and UPA’s veterans were both fighters for Ukraine’s 
freedom, and, thus, equally worthy of commemoration from behalf of the contemporaries. 
Domestically, these military and paramilitary organizations exemplify the protagonists of 
the narrative in the first place. As the president said on the occasion of 2015 May 9 
commemoration: 
                 “Going back to the Second World War, it should be said that alongside the leading role 
of the Red Army, the Ukrainian fronts and Soviet partisan movements, the Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army opened the second internal front against fascist invaders. The UPA considered Ukraine as 
independent state already back then, and not as a part of the Soviet Empire” (Poroshenko, 2015c)  
          Internationally, the president states overall contribution of the Ukrainians in UPA, 
Red Army and the Armies of Allies to victory over Nazism. In the same speech, president 
stated: 
               “The Ukrainians [Ukrainstvo10] of the whole world has contributed to fight with Nazis. 
As a part of the armies of Anti-Hitler’s coalition: the American, British, Canadian and the others. 
In the resistance movements of different European countries. On the fronts of Europe, North Africa 
and South-East Asia, the Pacific and Atlantic oceans” (ibid.; see also similar in content passage in 
Poroshenko, 2016g) 
          Finally, the president invokes historical experience of WW2 in relation to 
contemporary fighting in Eastern Ukraine (2014; 2015h; 2016b). Again, analyzed speeches 
suggest a directional understanding of Ukraine’s 20th century past meaning that 
experiences of WW2, and of historical nationalist underground, are contextualized into an 
overarching story of national liberation. National liberation aspiration unites contemporary 
fighters with historical fighters for Ukrainian independence.  
         Already in 2014, the president referred to the relevance of WW2 experiences for the 
contemporaries. In 2014 speech on Independence Day, the president invoked direct 
analogies between WW2 and unfolding military conflict in Donbas. As the president 
stated: 
               “The events of last several months became for us genuine war, even though undeclared. 
It may be commemorated as Patriotic War of 2014 in the future. As the war against foreign 
aggression. The war for Ukraine, its liberty, dignity and people. For Independence!” (Poroshenko, 
2014) 
                                                 
10 The original word “ukrainstvo” is a stronger than “ukraintsi” singular noun that refer to the nation as a whole 
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          The same speech was the first to equate various military formations from Ukrainian 
past in a sequential line of inheritance and to elevate Ukrainian wartime nationalists. By 
doing so, the president establishes a historical continuity between formations and 
experiences of the past and the present: 
                 “Our Armed Forces, the National Guard, the Border Guard, volunteer battalions have 
inherited the glory of Kyiv Rus Knyazs’ armies and Zaporozhian Sych, Ukrainian Sych Riflemen 
and the fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the army of Ukrainian People’s Republic and 
Ukrainians protecting Ukraine in the Red Army” (Poroshenko, 2014) 
          Moreover, when addressing young graduates of the military lyceum in Kyiv, the 
president spoke on how newly installed commemorative Day of Defender of Ukraine 
associated with UPA (October 14) resonates with the contemporaries: 
               “[…] These words were many times proven by Ukrainian Sych Riflemen, soldiers of 
Ukrainian Galician Army, troops of Ukrainian People’s Republic11, and fighters of UPA […] 
However, foremost this holiday, which was established by my decision last year, will resonate with 
contemporary heroes, participants of the war for our independence, participants of the Anti-
Terrorist operation and combat.” (Poroshenko, 2015b) 
          The year after, the president again has established direct continuity between 
historical Ukrainian military formations. This time as opposing to the false Soviet/Russian 
tradition to celebrate the creation of the Red Army (February 23):  
               “Two year ago I decided to withdraw from false celebration of the main military holiday 
according to aggressor-state’s calendar. And new commemorative date has naturalized extremely 
quickly. Why? Because its roots in old Pokrova holiday, which used to be honored by our Cossack 
ancestors. Its roots in Sych’s hovels and in bunkers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army” (Poroshenko, 
2016d) 
          In parliamentary sessions devoted to legal recognition of nationalist underground, 
nationalists only are considered to exemplify national liberation struggle, MPs justify 
nationalists as exemplifying ultimate and genuine Ukrainian wartime experience. This 
induces the MPs to frame the issue in terms of obligation to remember and engage 
Ukrainian nationalists as legitimate part of WW2 remembrance by available legal means 
(Parubiy, Medunycia, Mosiychuk, Liashko in VRU, 2015a; Viatrovych, Shuhevych, 
Krul’ko, Holovko in VRU, 2015a; Medunycia in VRU, 2015c; Kniazytskiy in VRU, 
2016c).  
          The UINR’s publications follow the general trend to elevate wartime nationalists. 
On the one hand, the nationalist underground is seen as ultimately ‘Ukrainian’. As UINR’s 
publication stated when discussing Ukrainians’ contribution in WW2, ‘but only one army 
formation fought under the Ukrainian flag during the war – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’ 
                                                 
11 The president recounted military and paramilitary formations from 1917-1922 period of Ukraine’s past. 
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(2015b, p. 4). Also, in the same publication, Remembrance institute places UPA’s 
contribution in victory over Nazism alongside states’ military formations, i.g. the Red 
Army, the US Army etc. (ibid., p. 7). On the other hand, domestically-oriented UINR’s 
publication (Viatrovych et al., 2016) takes an openly apologetic and condescending 
framing of the wartime nationalist underground, which is considered to be comparable in 
nature to Western European resistance movements (Bigun, 2016a, b, c, d, e; Isaiuk, 2016a; 
Riabenko, 2016d; Butko and Riabenko, 2016; Viatrovych 2016b).  
          The UINR’s publications usually omit existing in Western scholarship controversies 
around nationalist underground (see footnote to Annex 1). Interestingly, for foreign 
audiences, UINR elaborates on the underground as example of anti-communist and anti-
Nazi resistance movement (UINR, 2015b, p. 18-19). In domestically-oriented publications, 
the authors additionally take openly whitewashing stances. The head of the institute, for 
instance, denied at once exclusionary and xenophobic strains of nationalists’ ideology and 
aspiration to build a mono-ethnic Ukrainian state (Viatrovych, 2016b). Moreover, several 
entries tolerate collaboration of Ukrainian nationalists with Nazi Germany in the initial 
years of WW2 (prior to 1943). In such cases, the emphasis is placed on national liberation 
aspirations of the nationalists, which considered service in German military structures as a 
tool to achieve national independence (Isaiuk and Riabenko, 2016; Isaiuk, 2016a). In this 
logic, for instance, Wehrmacht’s military units “Roland” and “Nachtigall”12 recruited from 
Ukrainian nationalists and taking part in offensive against the Soviet Union in 1941 are 
seen as proto-Ukrainian national army. Interestingly, motives and intentions of Ukrainian 
nationalists to collaborate with Nazi Germany are prescribed to Ukrainians in general. As 
Isaiuk argues: 
               “Ukrainians were in need of allies in creating national military structures. The circle of 
possible allies was narrow, as far as the activity of these units was directed against the powers 
between which Ukrainians was divided […] And, for this reason, there was a need to find suitable 
ally, who would assist in creating future national army. Germany was considered to be suitable 
ally because of the common enemy – the Soviet Union” (Isaiuk, 2016a, p. 136)  
          The same entry emphasizes that created units had never belonged German SS 
(Schutzstaffel) units, but were ‘in operational command of Wehrmacht’ (ibid., p. 136). This 
juxtaposition of SS and service in Wehrmacht, or even service in German auxiliary police 
(ibid., p. 138), is repeated in the other entry on Ukrainian nationalists and German military 
(Isaiuk and Riabenko, 2016, p. 124-125). Apparently, claiming that these recruited from 
                                                 
12 The commander of the Nachtigall Battalion was Roman Shukhevych - the future Supreme commander of the UPA. 
On intricacies of Shukhevych’s biography and mentioned military formations see more in Rudling, 2016  
 
 
61 
 
nationalists military units were not part of SS legitimizes them in the logic of the authors. 
Also, on one occasion, Isaiuk and Riabenko take rather condescending attitude to Waffen-
SS volunteers. The following passage on division Waffen-SS “Galizien” is particularly 
revealing: 
               “Although the formation had had the notion of “SS” in its title prior to April 1945, the 
division from its beginning was only a military formation. For this reason, it belonged not to 
structures of general SS (Allgemeine SS), but to so called troops of SS (Waffen SS) […] Division 
’Halychyna’ was intended for military combat on the front alongside Wehrmacht” (Isaiuk and 
Riabenko, 2016, p. 125) 
          Although Isaiuk and Riabenko described that ‘Halychyna’ division engaged in 
combat with approaching into Western Ukraine the Red Army, and was used to suppress 
Slovak anti-Nazi uprising as well as Tito’s partisans in the Balkans13, they do not make 
any normative judgment over the issues but rather just document division’s military record 
(ibid., p. 126-127).  
 
4.2.2. The Holocaust 
          The Holocaust has not emerged as a separate topic in elite-mythmaking of WW2 in 
modern Ukraine. The most striking is the cases of analyzed parliamentary sessions, during 
which notions of the Holocaust, Shoah or extermination of Jews have never been brought 
into discussions. The President and UINR have addressed or mentioned the topic of the 
Holocaust. However, in both cases, the topic has surfaced depending on intended audiences 
of disseminated texts and speeches.  
          In the case of the president, there is no consistency between different speeches. On 
the one hand, in Babyn Yar speech (2016f), president has addressed the issue of the 
Holocaust in Ukraine and framed it as part of the European remembrance of WW2. In the 
speech, the president addressed the topic of local Ukrainian collaboration in the 
Holocaust14. As it is argued previously in this thesis, revealing local participation in the 
Holocaust is usually seen as part of Europeanizing national discourses on WW2 (see e.g. 
Lebow, 2006). Moreover, in recent address on Holocaust Remembrance Day (2017a), the 
president spoke on preserving memory about the Holocaust, and dangers of totalitarian 
ideologies cultivating hate and crimes against humanity. On the other hand, the topic does 
                                                 
13 On wartime pathway of the Division see Rudling, 2012b and Khromeychuk, 2013 
14 It is important to point out that the 75th anniversary of Babyn Yar shootings in Kyiv in September 2016 had an 
unprecedented international exposure and attention. Number of foreign dignitaries, including Presidents of Israel, 
Germany and European Council visited official mourning ceremony in Kyiv. See highlights about the event in 
Associated Press (AP, 2016) or President of EC Donald Tusk’s speech (2016) 
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not emerge in other presidential speeches and addresses, including devoted to 8 and 9 May 
(2015c, d, h; 2016g). For instance, on the occasion of Day of the liberation of Nazi 
concentration camps, the president did not mention Jewish victims of Nazism, but spoke 
in general terms about ‘millions of victims’ of Nazi camps, including ‘mass killings of 
prisoners of the war, civilians and children’ (2016c), and ‘millions of our fellow co-
patriots’ (2017b), who ceased in the camps. Interestingly, in both cases, the president 
substantiated his speeches with either mentioning contemporary ‘captives and unjustly 
convicted in Russia and occupied by Russia territory’ (2015c) or with equating ‘Nazi 
camps’ and ‘Soviet gulags’ (2017b). 
          This leads to a conclusion that topic of Holocaust appears in presidential speeches 
depending on the level of international exposure of the event, as it was in the case of 75th 
anniversary of Babyn Yar shootings in Kyiv, or the occasion itself, as it was in the case of 
the Holocaust Remembrance Day address.   
          The Remembrance institute has addressed Holocaust differently depending on 
intended audiences of its texts. In analyzed English-language UINR’s publication (UINR, 
2015b), Holocaust is mentioned and addressed when speaking about Ukrainians honored 
as the ‘Righteous among the Nations’ (UINR, 2015b, p. 5, 17) and Nazi crimes on territory 
of Ukraine (ibid., p. 16-17). The publications also mentioned local collaboration in one 
passage (ibid., p. 6). However, “The War and the Myth” (Viatrovych et al., 2016), which 
has been published only in Ukrainian, takes a situational mentioning of the Holocaust and 
Babyn Yar. Table 3 summarizes what is said about Nazi extermination of Jews in Ukraine 
according to the latter UINR’s publication, discusses context of when Holocaust, Babyn 
Yar or extermination of Ukrainian Jews are mentioned, and provides bibliographical 
reference (see Annex 2). As Table 3 illustrates, the Holocaust either appears in unrelated 
context to the issue of European-wide extermination of Jews or even in whitewashing 
context in the case of one author.  
          In general, neither presidential speeches nor UINR’s publications address or discuss 
the Holocaust as separate or significant topic of modern WW2 remembrance in Ukraine. 
Importantly, topic of the Holocaust resurfaces in speeches and texts of memory agents in 
relation to intended (foreign) audiences of disseminated information. Thus, because of the 
context of the event, in which Holocaust appears in presidential speeches, and the content 
of minor and scattered mentioning of it in UINR’s publications, it may be argued that the 
Holocaust is anomaly in newly forged narrative of WW2.  
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4.2.3. The Volyn massacres of 1943 
          The case of Volyn ethnic cleansing has not been addressed clearly or discussed in 
substance. The topic of Volyn appeared in reaction to Polish Parliament’s July 2016 vote 
to recognize the issue as genocide of the Ukrainian nationalists perpetrated against Polish 
civilians. This event had a reaction from behalf of the President and the UINR in the forms 
of press releases or commenting for domestic media (see e.g. Duda and Poroshenko, 2016; 
UNIAN, 2016). As such, Volyn massacres did not appear in analyzed UINR’s publications 
or presidential addresses, eligible for examining them as part of official governmental elite-
mythmaking in this thesis15.  
          The Volyn massacres of 1943 was discussed in separate Parliament’s statement and 
two supporting parliamentary factions’ statements. The VRU statement (VRU, 2016a) was 
adopted following developments in Poland in the form of response to Polish Parliament.  
          Firstly, the VRU statement constantly avoids addressing the event of purging 
civilians in the first place. It never uses direct references, but always broad terms of ‘tragic 
pages of Ukrainian-Polish history, which concern the events in Volyn’, ‘Polish-Ukrainian 
conflict’, ‘innocent victims: Poles and Ukrainians’ (VRU, 2016a). Also, it broadens 
timespan of the event from 1943, which has direct association with UPA emergence, to 
speaking about ‘1940s’ generally.  
          Secondly, the statement did not mention or name the Ukrainian nationalist 
underground, or OUN and UPA, at all. The phrase ‘Ukrainian nationalists’ appears twice 
when the document cites the titles of Polish Parliament’s document on the issue of Volyn. 
Finally, the statement takes quasi-reconciliatory language and does not bring issues or 
notions of guilt and responsibility. Instead, it uses phrases ‘reconciliation’ and 
‘forgiveness’ in a manner if mutual reconciliation has been already achieved. In this 
relation, the document has stated that contemporaries made ‘a lot for mutual forgiveness 
and commemoration of Ukrainians and Poles that had been killed during the conflict of 
1940s’ (ibid.). Moreover, it considers the developments in Poland to legally frame the issue 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that since July 2016, UINR has engaged in commenting on the issue in two forms. Firstly, the 
head of the Institute, Volodymyr Viatrovych, commented on the issue for domestic audience. For instance, on 
February 28, 2017, Mr Viatrovych delivered a public lecture in the premises of Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National 
University entitled ‘Volyn’43: Why memory divides Poland and Ukraine’, and engaged into discussion with Polish 
historian Grzegorz Motyka over the issue. Secondly, co-workers of the UINR are active social media users. The topic of 
Volyn appears in social media groups of academic historians and UINR’s professionals (see historians.in.ua on 
facebook.com).However, content analysis of social media profiles is beyond design of this thesis 
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of anti-Polish ethnic cleansing as unilateral ‘politicization of history’ (ibid.), which 
damages the diplomatic and strategic partnership between two countries. Similarly, 
‘Narodnij Front’ has urged to focus on contemporary Polish-Ukrainian relations, avoid 
damaging the relations rather than addressing the issue of Volyn on its own (Faction 
‘Nardonij Front’, 2016). ‘Batkivshhina’ faction asserted the developments as ‘slandering 
the Ukrainian nation and dignity of Ukrainians’ (Faction ‘Batkivshhina’, 2016). 
          By employing this three-fold tactics, the VRU statement dilutes addressing the event 
of Volyn-1943. Paradoxically but, according to the document, events in Volyn in 1943 turn 
from unilateral act of ethnic cleansing to bilateral Polish-Ukrainian conflict of the 1940s, 
the perpetrators remain unnamed, and, consequently, issues of guilt and facing 
responsibility are left aside and never addressed.  
 
4.3. Narrative’s character 
          Getting down to the category of narrative’s character, it may be said that the 
narrative combines glorifying with omissions in the case of nationalist underground, and, 
basically, omits the Holocaust and wrongdoing of Volyn of 1943. To remind briefly, the 
category of narrative’s character focuses on how key events are described by memory 
agents of elite-mythmaking of WW2 in terms of glorification, whitewashing, shifting 
responsibility, or critical acknowledgment of wrongdoing. Importantly, self-glorification 
refers to ‘positive self-image’ encompassed in elevating national pride and virtues (Pääbo, 
2011). Glorification may take form of praising heroism or heroic victimhood (see more in 
Pääbo, 2011, p. 60-61, He, 2007, p. 45). At the same time, whitewashing is usually 
exemplified with omissions or outright denials (ibid.). In this relation, memory agents of 
elite-mythmaking praise the nationalist underground for its national liberation aspiration 
and withdraw from addressing controversies around the wartime nationalists. Moreover, 
in comparison with other memory agents, the UINR makes further steps in drawing 
preferable images of the underground in more detail in its publications. This goes against 
a critical attitude of the Western peer-reviewed and English-language scholarship16 
towards the underground and suggests that UINR’s activities fall into category of ‘militant 
historians’ (Mink, 2008) or ‘mnemonic warriors’ (Bernhard and Kubik, 2014) who 
consider their ‘history’ as an ultimate truth to be incorporated and remembered.  
                                                 
16 See more in literature review by Umland, 2017 
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          Furthermore, as a consequence of the apologetic attitude to wartime nationalists’ 
organizations, memory agents rather avoid addressing controversies around Ukrainian 
‘dark pasts’. In this regard, only the president has attempted to incorporate the Holocaust 
into Ukrainian WW2 remembrance. However, as this thesis argues, these attempts were 
rather situational. Similarly, the UINR undertook pragmatic approach to addressing the 
Holocaust by employing different tactics for intended foreign or domestic audiences. 
Finally, the ‘dark past’ of Volyn remained unaddressed with memory agents reacting to 
memory activism on the issue from abroad. This may be explained with additional hardship 
to accommodate image of OUN – UPA as glorious resistance movement with strains of 
exclusionary ideology and act of ethnic cleansing.  
 
4.4. Narrative’s plot: ‘stateless victimhood’17 
          This category unites the categories of protagonist & antagonist, key events and 
narrative’s character and contemplates over a pattern between the elements. The narrative 
reproduces a pattern of ‘stateless victimhood’ by focusing on statelessness, antagonizing 
the Soviet Union, positioning protagonist against to ‘two totalitarianisms’. 
          Firstly, the narrative of WW2 places emphasis on statelessness of Ukrainians as the 
nation’s main characteristic. Either in the presidential speeches or in the UINR’s 
publications, stateless Ukrainians as a nation have contributed to the victory over Nazism. 
The Ukrainians are seen as co-equal to the Allies in their’ contribution in victory and 
ending up as the United Nations co-founder.  
          Secondly, the narrative ascribes the notion of a goal of national liberation to WW2 
and the whole 20th century. The national liberation is implied when describing wartime 
developments, and, in this relation, victory over Nazism did not bring genuine liberation 
to the Ukrainians. One heading in UINR’s publication about the ‘return’ of the Soviet 
Union to the territory of Ukraine suggests formula that can be applied to the narrative as a 
whole : ‘victory, but not liberation’ (UINR, 2015b, p. 22). Importantly, memory agents of 
elite-mythmaking establish continuity between pre-WW2 and modern Ukrainian 
                                                 
17 The term ‘stateless victimhood’ belongs to Yuliya Yurchuk (2017). According to Yurchuk, ‘unifying element’ of 
contemporary Ukrainian memory politics id: “the narrative of stateless victimhood, which conveyed the story of 
Ukrainians who were fighting for other’s interests. As Ukrainians had no country of their own, they were used by 
others states in pursuit of often-contradictory interests” (2017, p. 93). The term applies to this thesis as well. 
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statehood, and invest in Ukrainian nationalist underground as exemplifying liberation 
cause. 
          Thirdly, the narrative portrays the Soviet Union negatively and glorifies anti-Soviet 
Ukrainian nationalist underground. Due to the Soviet regime’s crimes and negative role in 
the outbreak and developments of WW2, the Soviet Union is condemned by memory 
agents. Moreover, the absence of genuinely Ukrainian ‘memory’ of the war is associated 
with the Soviet Union.  
          Fourthly, as to relations between protagonist and antagonist, subjugated stateless 
Ukrainians is juxtaposed to morally negative role of the Soviet Union in WW2. Memory 
agents prefer to deny and disentangle the Soviet past at once by ‘discovering’ Ukrainian 
past rather than engage in an attenuated discussion of formerly being a part of the Soviet 
Union. The notion of being between ‘two totalitarianisms’ is especially elaborated by the 
UINR for foreign audience while subjugation to an unjust regime and being deprived of 
Ukrainian perspective for domestic audience. 
          As to ‘martyrological’ events, the narrative considers wartime developments on 
Ukraine’s territory as martyrological rather chooses one event specifically. The imposition 
of the Soviet state structures in the Western Ukraine in 1939, mass repression of civilians 
during the war, the immense losses of the Battle of the Dnipro, Crimean Tatars deportations 
of 1944, and post-war crack down on Ukrainian nationalists exemplify martyrological 
events of new WW2 remembrance. 
          There is a hardship for memory agents to choose one specific event, which would 
symbolize diverse WW2 experiences and equally ‘speak’ to all Ukrainians nowadays. The 
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, which is the most negative event on WW2 remembrance in the 
Baltics context, definitely exemplifies negative role of the Soviet Union in WW2 and its 
cooperation with Nazi Germany. The UINR’s publications have condemned the pact and 
covered its negative role in WW2 extensively (UINR, 2015b, p. 10-11; Galushko and 
Pyliavets, 2016; Zinchenko et al. 2016; Horobets, 2016a, b). However, the president and 
MPs prefer to speak about mass repressions committed in the Soviet Union (e.g. 
Poroshenko, 2015g; 2016e, h). This leads to suggest that the pact does not fit the status of 
the main martyrological event in the Ukrainian context. As far as the pact did not impact 
or was related to all Ukraine, it is doubtful that memory agents can invest great symbolic 
meaning, and, needless to say, to foster popular attachment to negative role of the pact. 
The efforts to establish the pact in newly forged remembrance of WW2 rather intended to 
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shift from 1941 to 1939 as the initial year of the war and relate to European discourses of 
WW2. 
 
4.5. Discussion  
          The thesis has illustrated the conceptual argument that political elites engage in elite-
mythmaking and narrative construction to install preferable representation of the past 
based on the case of WW2 representation in modern Ukraine. 
          On legal and administrative side of mythmaking, memory agents engage in 
construction of political memory of WW2 in Ukraine. The elite-mythmaking enjoys 
policy-making agreement over the issues of remembrance between the agents and has a 
comprehensive agenda to foster new framework of WW2 remembrance. The ‘artifacts’ of 
political memory of WW2 are: imposing ‘de-communizing’ legal framework on WW2; 
protecting the national liberation cause and wartime fighters for Ukrainian independence, 
disregarding Soviet state-building by the law removing Soviet relicts from public spaces 
by the administrative measures; prescribing commemorative policy. 
          On the narrative construction side of mythmaking, the pattern of disentangling the 
Soviet past by condemning and antagonizing the Soviet Union’s role in WW2 is 
reproduced with simultaneous establishment of Ukrainian perspective on WW2: 
protagonizing stateless Ukrainians and stating their contribution to victory over Nazism, 
legitimizing Ukrainian wartime nationalists and Ukrainians beyond the Soviet Union.  
          The narrative construction is marked by essentialization of the past. This is well 
exemplified with the UINR’s understanding of the ‘myths’ of the past. On the one hand, 
the Remembrance Institute uses the notion in a narrow sense when referring to efforts to 
conceal unpleasant past. Fabricating information about Katyn massacres (Zinchenko 
2016a, c) or blaming Soviet security forces sabotage actions on Nazis (Horobets, 2016c) 
discussed as myths in a sense of being falsified and fabricated in post-WW2 Soviet Union. 
On the other hand, memory agents of mythmaking use the notion in a broad sense when 
referring to Soviet interpretation of the war and whole period of Ukraine’s Soviet past. It 
is usual for the president, for instance, to contrast false Soviet and genuine Ukrainian 
commemorative days of Defender of Ukraine (see Poroshenko, 2014, 2015b). 
        This again suggests narrative’s prime focus on essentializing the representation of the 
past. In this logic, mythological and imposed Soviet interpretation of WW2 is disregarded 
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as unreliable. Thereafter, the genuine experience and genuine ‘history’ is considered to be 
‘discovered’ only nowadays by moving from the ‘myths’ or even ‘the Myth’ of the Soviet 
past (see e.g. Zinchenko, 2016a and Viatrovych, 2016c). As the Head of Remembrance 
institute stated in the front of the Parliament: 
               “We, unfortunately, see how the Soviet myths about the war are being used by the Russian 
Federation and its propaganda in order to wage war against modern Ukraine. For this reason, it 
is important to rid of these myths […] Our task is to return genuine memory about wartime years 
and rid of the Soviet clichés” (Viatrovych in VRU, 2015a; bold typeface added) 
          Moreover, these myths are claimed to contribute to Ukraine’s contemporary 
hardships. As Viatrovych argues, ‘preserving the Soviet myths about the war is extremely 
important for modern Russia, as far as they became main and sometimes the last remaining 
element of Soviet identity of some of our co-citizens’ (Viatrovych, 2016c, p. 253; italics 
added). This is an example of exclusionary, essentializing and even proselytizing 
understanding of ‘history’. 
         This immediately leads to contemplate over modern elite-mythmaking to 
contemporary conflict dynamics in Ukraine. This in only that upholding mythmaking by 
legal and administrative measures endangers freedom of speech and academic freedom, as 
prominent scholars are concerned (see Open letter by Marples, 2015), but also that elite-
mythmaking is rather incompatible with building trust in a divided society (Dembinska, 
2010). Domestically, the strong case in favor administrative measures and exclusionary 
understanding of the past would rather entrench cleavages, confine society to highly 
contested and mutually exclusionary frameworks of WW2 remembrance and spin the 
resentment further. In fact, future research may inquire in whether the elite-mythmaking is 
successful at all, or in other words, whether it has reciprocity and engagement from behalf 
of the broader public. The issue is especially relevant taking into account Ukraine’s 
regional diversity and different wartime experiences. Internationally, as Mälksoo 
suggested, legislating representation of the past does not ‘secure’, but aggravates ‘security 
dilemmas’ of the states (Mälksoo, 2015, p. 222-223). Following Mälksoo, it is possible to 
suggest that memory agents of elite-mythmaking in Ukraine will end up with even more 
reduced sense of ontological security (Mälksoo, 2015, Subotic, 2016) vis-à-vis ongoing 
Russian aggression in Ukraine. 
       The European discourses on WW2 can be approached from ‘thick’ (content-oriented) 
and ‘thin’ (practice-oriented) standpoints (Müller, 2010). Firstly, the European 
remembrance of WW2 has a negative attitude towards historical totalitarian regimes and 
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establishes ‘memory of victims’ as bottom line for a common European remembrance of 
the war (see European Parliament, 2008, 2009). Secondly, European national contexts also 
show a variation in what is being remembered about WW2. Usually, the Western and 
German narratives of WW2 is seen as memorializing the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes 
in the first place in the national frameworks of WW2 remembrance (Mälksoo, 2009; Siddi, 
2016). The Holocaust is central element of memorialization in the German discourse on 
WW2, while the Western European narratives elevate the national resistance against Nazi 
occupation (Siddi, 2016; Lagrou, 1999, 2003). At the same time, the Eastern Central 
European (ECE) narratives diverge further from the former two in towards emphasizing 
the Soviet Union’s negative role in their WW2 commemoration (Mälksoo, 2009; 
Neumayer, 2015; Siddi, 2016). Simultaneously, the ECE narratives overlook the 
unpleasant past of local collaboration with the Nazis in the Holocaust or obliterate other 
context-specific ‘dark pasts’, and establish, in the words of Neumayer, narrative of ‘crimes 
of communism’ in the region (Neumayer, 2015).  
          The ‘thin’ or practice-oriented approach to the representation of WW2 is 
encapsulated in practices of ‘coming to terms with past’ (Müller, 2010). By engaging in 
critical reevaluation of the national past, political elites recognize historical wrongdoings, 
memoralise and engage into public atonement for wrongdoings. In this case, collaboration, 
exclusionary policies toward minorities in the past, ethnic strife become legitimate parts 
of ‘Europeanized’ national remembrances of WW2 projected by political elites in official 
governmental memory politics (Lebow, 2006; Müller, 2010; Pakier and Strath, 2010).  
          In the light of European discourses of WW2, the Ukrainian narrative follows the 
negative attitude towards the Soviet totalitarian regime in a line with the other European 
counterparts. The narrative construction of memory agents antagonizes the Soviet Union 
foremost in the national narrative of WW2. This is supported with legal action to 
delegitimize the Soviet state-building in Ukraine. 
          However, the memory agents remain ignorant of the Holocaust and obscure the ‘dark 
past’ of Volyn massacres of 1943. In content, as the analysis above has shown, the narrative 
is preoccupied with drawing ‘genuinely’ Ukrainian perspective on the war, focuses on the 
notion of statelessness and essentializes the past in general. This suggest that memory 
agents hold rather exclusionary understanding of the wartime experiences. In this 
understanding, the tragedy of Ukrainian Jews does not belong to the Ukrainian perspective 
and remembrance of WW2. Needless to say, wrongdoings in relation to Jews or ‘dark past’ 
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of Volyn would undermine pattern of ‘stateless victimhood’ and the positive image of 
national liberation movement and, therefore, avoided in the narrative.  
        From ‘thin’ perspective on WW2 remembrance, the memory agents also do not follow 
practices of atonement for national wrongdoings. Elite-mythmaking easily disentangles the 
Soviet past and substitutes it with the search for ‘genuine’ Ukrainian history of WW2 
framed in essentialising terms. The Soviet Union and Soviet Ukraine’s past are easily 
denied precisely because there is no attachment to this past among the memory agents or 
voluntarily embraced acknowledgment of being part of the Soviet Union in the past. In 
some sense, the Ukrainian mythmaking agenda to condemn the Soviet totalitarianism 
inadvertently coincides with European humanitarian dimension to commemorate victims 
of totalitarians during WW2 in modern remembrance. Finally, the memory agents are not 
ready to atone for the past, which they consider ‘Ukrainian’ and in which they invest 
symbolic attachment.  
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Conclusions 
          The aim of this thesis was to inquire in official governmental memory politics 
(mythmaking) pertaining to remembrance of World War Two in modern Ukraine. In order 
to evaluate whether this elite-mythmaking could be called ‘European’ (the puzzle), the 
thesis has examined political memory construction, encapsulated in legislative and 
administrative measures of political elites (memory agents), and construction of the 
narrative, which is being communicated by these memory agents.  
          In order to examine current memory politics in Ukraine, the thesis utilized concepts 
of political memory, memory agent, elite-mythmaking and narrative on the one hand, and 
‘European memory’ of WW2 on the other.  Thereafter, the thesis proceeded with analysis 
of the legislative and administrative framework installed by the President, the Parliament, 
and the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance as main ‘stakeholders’ of new 
commemorative paradigm of WW2. Then, by following the premises of structural and 
thematic narrative analysis (research design), the thesis scrutinized the narrative about the 
Ukrainians in WW2, which is being communicated by these memory agents as part of 
modern elite-mythmaking. 
          Based on the analysis, this thesis has argued that post-2014 Ukrainian memory 
politics concerning WW2 remembrance constitutes a case of elite-mythmaking of political 
memory of WW2 and constructs the narrative representing historical experiences of 
wartime past, which is suitable for contemporary agents of elite-mythmaking. The 
President, the Parliament and the Ukrainian Remembrance institute selectively 
‘Europeanize’ representation of WW2 with regard to alienating the Soviet past and 
condemning the Soviet totalitarianism but, at the same time, do not aim to engage in 
‘coming to terms with the past’ practices with regard to the national past. Furthermore, the 
narrative communicated by the memory agents reproduces the same pattern of 
disentangling Ukraine’s Soviet past and withdrawing to engage in discussion about 
intricacies of the national past, constitutive to the Western European or German narratives 
of WW2. Even though the memory agents officially state the need for more attenuated 
understanding wartime experiences and commemoration of WW2, they are preoccupied 
with developing more exclusionary and essentializing understanding of the past at the 
narrative’s level. Based on the analysis of the narrative data disseminated by the memory 
agents, this thesis suggests that the newly forged narrative follows the essential 
 
 
72 
 
characteristics of the Eastern Central European (ECE) historical narrative on the Second 
World War.  
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Appendices 
Annex 1 
 
Table 2. Antagonist and protagonist according to UINR 
Protagonist 
/ 
Antagonist  
What is being communicated? Reference  
the 
Ukrainians 
(role and 
image) 
a). Chronological shift from 1941 to 
1939 
 
b). emphasis on Ukrainians as ‘divided 
nation’ between different states and 
regimes; inclusion of pre-Soviet 
Ukrainian state-building into narrative 
on WW2; emphasizing the role of 
national community in the victory over 
Nazism 
c). ‘Ukrainian Liberation movement’ as 
legitimate actor of WW2, contributing 
both to the Allies’ victory over Nazism 
as well as national liberation struggle 
 
d). heroic pantheon: focus on soldiers of 
the Ukrainian background in the Armies 
of Allies  
UINR, 2015b, p. 4; Horobets, 2016a; 
Prymachenko, 2016c 
UINR, 2015b, p. 6-9; Prymachenko, 
2016d 
 
 
 
 
UINR, 2015b, p. 7, 18-19; Maiorov, 
2016c; Isaiuk and Riabenko, 2016, 
2016d; Bigun, 2016a, b, c, d, e; 
Isaiuk, 2016a, b; Viatrovych 2016b 
 
 
 
UINR, 2015b, p. 5, 24-25 
The Soviet 
Union (role 
and image) 
a). condemnation of the Soviet Union for 
its role in the outbreak of the war and 
cooperation with Nazi Germany; focus 
on Molotov-Ribbentrop pact; 
 
 
UINR, 2015b, p. 10-11; Maiorov, 
2016a, b; Galushko, 2016a; 
Galushko and Pylavets, 2016; 
Zinchenko et al., 2016; Zinchenko, 
2016b; Horobets, 2016b; Pavlov 
2016a 
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b). critical attitude to the Soviet Union’s 
‘scorched earth’ practice, military 
wartime crimes (unprecedented military 
losses, ill-prepared military operations 
on territory of Ukraine); separate 
emphasis on the Soviet totalitarian 
regime crimes on territory of Ukraine 
between 1939-1945 (shootings of 
civilians, mass repressions in Western 
Ukraine in 1939-1941) with a 
transnational focus (inclusion of the 
Katyn massacres); stating equal 
criminality of the Soviet Union and Nazi 
Germany  
 
d). ‘Victory, but not Liberation’: the 
Soviet Union’s ‘return’ is accompanied 
with mass repression, crackdown on 
Ukrainian nationalists, Crimean Tartars 
deportations of 1944 
 
 
UINR, 2015b, p. 11-15, 18, 20; 
Zinchenko, 2016c; Riabenko 2016b, 
c, e, f; Horobets, 2016c; Gromenko, 
2016a; Galushko, 2016b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UINR, 2015b, p. 22-23; Gromenko, 
2016c, d, e; Horobets, 2016d 
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Table 3. The Holocaust and “The War and the Myth” (Viatrovych et al., 2016) 
The Holocaust Reference Context Passage 
Mentioning of 
Babyn Yar 
“Myth 15: Dniproges, 
Hreschatyk, and 
Uspenian Cathedral in 
Kyiv were demolished 
by Nazis” (Horobets, 
2016b) 
Extermination of Jews in Babyn Yar is 
mentioned in the context of addressing 
sabotage actions of retreating from Kyiv and 
Ukraine the Soviet security forces (NRVD): 
blowing up the dam of Dniproges powerplant, 
mine laying of Hreschatyk 
“German occupation authorities used the explosions 
organized by the Soviet security forces to blame Kyiv’s 
Jews and justify their mass extermination in Babyn Yar in 
September 29 and 30, 1941” (Horobets, 2016b, p. 85) 
mentioning of 
extermination of 
Jews and Babyn 
Yar 
“Myth 27: Ukrainian 
nationalists annihilated 
Jews during the war on 
a massive scale, 
especially in Lviv and 
Babyn Yar” 
(Riabenko, 2016d) 
extermination of Ukrainian Jews and Babyn 
Yar are mentioned in the context of the 
controversy around the Ukrainian 
nationalists’ collaboration with Nazis. The 
massive collaboration is disregarded, and 
attributed to separate Ukrainian nationalists, 
who could have taken part in pogroms or 
willingly collaborated in the Holocaust. The 
On German auxiliary police and the locals: “The 
regiments were organized from locals, Soviet POWs, 
former Soviet militiamen, and among them could have 
been members of OUN. By nationality, the regiments 
included not only Ukrainians, but also Russians and other 
nationalities. The locals sometimes took part in anti-
Jewish pogroms, but those were not only Ukrainians, but 
also others.” (Riabenko, 2016d, p. 140) 
On the ‘myth’ of nationalists’ participation in the 
Holocaust in general: “This is one more historical myth, 
using which Soviet and then Russian propaganda tried to 
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paragraph has clear whitewashing 
inclination.18 
justify punitive actions against OUN and UPA. 
Supposedly, ‘Banderivtsi’ had been preoccupied only 
with massive extermination of Jews, Poles and female 
school teachers of Russian language” (Riabenko, 2016d, 
p. 140) 
 
Mentioning of the 
Holocaust in 
general 
“Myth 50: ‘No one is 
forgotten, nothing is 
forgotten’” 
(Yaremenko, 2016) 
Mentioned in the context of addressing issue 
of ‘silencing’ of inconvenient pasts in the late 
Soviet Union 
“Deportations of Crimean Tatars and Germans of 
Ukraine, Ukrainian-Polish conflict, as well as tragedy of 
Holocaust became taboos. Banning the memory about 
Jewish catastrophe was made because of Soviet 
authorities’ reluctance to consider Jews as the main 
victims of Nazi occupation […] Only during perestroika, 
speaking about Jewish victims has resurfaced. Unpopular 
themes were also occupation of Ukraine, ostarbeiter 
issue, and also Ukrainian liberation movement, which 
fought both Nazis and communists ” (Yaremenko, 2016, 
p. 248) 
                                                 
18 In brief, there is a scholarly consensus on ideology and wrongdoings of Ukrainian nationalist underground. Genuine anti-Semitic and anti-Polish component of nationalists’ ideology as 
well as they participation in the Holocaust and anti-Polish ethnic cleansing in Volyn of 1943 is known and well-studied in the Western scholarship (Berkhoff and Carynnyk, 1999; Carynnyk, 
2011; Himka, 2012; Rossolinski-Liebe, 2016, Rudling 2011, 2012, 2016). Also, see recent literature review on the issue in Umland, 2017. 
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Mentioning of the 
Holocaust in 
general 
“War on Myths” 
(Zinchenko, 2016a) 
Mentioned in the context of contemporary 
memory politics agenda with a ‘comparative 
martyrology’ inclination 
“Putin’s Russia is a country where Stalin is an ‘efficient 
manager’, the Russian people is a ‘victorious nation’, 
which ‘would have won without Ukrainians at all’, and 
the biggest catastrophe of 20th century is not the war, the 
Holodomor, or the Holocaust, ‘but demolition of the 
Soviet Union’” (Zinchenko, 2016a, p. 10) 
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